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In response to the institutionalisation of the transitional justice field, and its predilection 
towards top-down approaches, it has been increasingly recognised that informal methods and 
marginalised groups can play important roles in catalysing a broader process of transitional justice. 
Nevertheless, the roles of young people in these processes have often been disregarded and 
dismissed by scholars and practitioners alike. Tunisia represents a critical case to test the idea that 
young people, specifically youth activists, might be seen as a resource in transitional justice 
processes. Young Tunisians have been hailed domestically and internationally as the 
revolutionaries that sparked a transition to democracy, yet in the transitional process, “youth” have 
been repeatedly classified as too politically disengaged and inexperienced to affect the processes 
of democratisation and transitional justice. These reductions of youth agency mirror the 
simplification of transitional justice to a process of legal and political contest and neglect the role 
that youth, as a marginalised community, might play in catalysing a process of transitional justice 
via less formal methods. Drawing from field research conducted in Tunisia from June to August 
2019, this study finds that, as young Tunisians were marginalised from the official processes of 
transitional justice, they actively sought and offered alternative approaches that were critical to a 
much broader, societal project of pursuing transitional justice from the bottom up. Specifically 
exploring young activists’ command of the street and use of the arts, the paper sheds light on the 
value of informal methods in catalysing the process of truth-telling, demanding accountability, and 
the imagination of justice, as well as the important role of youth in orchestrating these alternative 
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Youth, Transitional Justice, and Tunisia 
 
 
The counts of the indictment are luxury, bad manners, contempt for authority, disrespect 
to elders, and a love for chatter in place of exercise. 
 
– Kenneth John Freeman.1 
 
 
Youth and Justice: A Nexus of Transitions? 
These words from Kenneth John Freeman’s dissertation of 1907 were used to capture the 
extensive list of grievances of ancient Greek philosophers and schoolmasters towards the 
offending young students of the time.2 Associations of youth with frivolity, ill temper, and 
disrespect are far from antiquated, but have been heard across civilisations and continue to prevail 
today. For Freeman’s reflection on ancient Greece, however, the counts of the indictment against 
youth do not appear in a vacuum; rather, these “Aristophanic diatribes” arose in response to a form 
of social change and transition away from “the old days”, “the old laws”, and, in the words of 
Aristophanes, “the good old style of education, in the days when Justice still prevailed”.3 The 
account illustrates that generational differences and their relation to social change have, rationally 
or irrationally, raised critical questions for societies over many centuries, and perhaps quite 
personally so for more elderly scholars. Such questions remain as relevant today as ever, not least 
in the context of scholarly deliberations on more modern concepts of ephebiphobia – the irrational 
fear of young people – and of democratisation, human rights, and transitional justice.4 Specifically, 
 
1 Kenneth John Freeman, Montague John Rendall (ed), Schools of Hellas; an essay on the practice and theory of 
ancient Greek education from 600 to 300 B. C. (London: Macmillan and co., 1907): p.74.  
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid, pp.72-74. 
4 Kirk A. Astroth, “Beyond Ephebiphobia: Problem Adults or Problem Youths?” The Phi Delta Kappan 75, No. 5 
(Jan., 1994): p. 412. 
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the opaque nature of scholarly and popular understandings of “youth”, coupled with theories of 
grassroots-led transitional justice from the bottom up, prompts this exploration of the role that can 
be played by young people in pursuing “justice” in transitional contexts.  
Just as Freeman’s analysis on ancient Greek schoolmasters indicates that contempt for the 
young is far from a new phenomenon, so too have scholars shown that the idea of transitional 
justice has featured throughout human history.5 From the purges of ancient Athens to the trials at 
Nuremberg after the Second World War, societies have regularly sought to engineer transitions 
and grappled with histories of violence and abuse.6 Nevertheless, it was not until the late 1980s 
and the early 1990s that transitional justice became conceptualised as a distinct field of study and 
practice.7 Over the past four decades the field has expanded rapidly in its exploration of theories 
of best practice and their implementation.8 The field has witnessed the prominent rise in key 
institutions such as the International Criminal Court, the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), as well 
as the rise of nationally-mandated initiatives, such as truth commissions, as seen in Latin America 
and most famously in South Africa.9 In response to the institutionalisation of the transitional justice 
field, and its predilection towards top-down legal approaches to the questions of transition and 
“justice”, scholars have fostered important debates on the value of unofficial methods to pursuing 
justice in transition and the roles of communities at the grassroots level.10 Nevertheless, the 
 
5 Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004): pp.3-24; Paige Arthur, “How "Transitions" Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of 
Transitional Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly, 31, no.2 (May 2009): p.327. 
6 Elster, pp.3-24. 
7 Ruti G. Teitel, Globalizing Transitional Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): p.3. 
8 Arthur, pp.321-367. 
9 Teitel, Globalizing Transitional Justice, p.6. 
10 Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern, “Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice from the Bottom Up,” 
Journal of Law and Society, 35, no.2 (2008): pp. 265-292; David Backer, “Civil Society and Transitional Justice: 
Possibilities, Patterns and Prospects” Journal of Human Rights 2, no.3 (2003): pp. 297-313; Christine Bell and 
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specific focus on the roles of young people in these processes has remained widely neglected by 
scholars and practitioners alike.11 Conceptions of youth as contemptuous, disrespectful, and idle 
continue to prevail, prompting the need to more meaningfully and thoroughly raise the question of 
the roles played by young people in contributing to processes of transitional justice.12 
Despite the prominent concern with “youth gangs”, “youth delinquency”, and the “youth 
bulge” at the national and international levels, the social group has remained hard to define.13 
Pierre Bourdieu’s useful contribution, succinctly titled “Youth’ is just a word”, to scholarly 
deliberations indicates that a definition may well be impossible and that “youth and age are not 
self-evident data but are socially constructed, in the struggle between the young and the old.”14 
Such understandings of “youth” have not satisfied most policymakers, however, as institutions 
insist on numerical calculations of youth as it  relates to age. Agencies of the United Nations (UN) 
define “youth” as the years between 15 and 24 years; the UN Security Council determines that 
“youth” is the years of 15 through 29 with the passing of resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and 
Security; meanwhile, UN Habitat indicates that “youth” falls between the ages of 15 and 32.15 
Such discrepancies only serve to highlight that numerical calculations cannot exclusively 
 
Catherine O’Rourke, “Does Feminism Need a Theory of Transitional Justice? An Introductory Essay,” International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 1, no.1 (2007): pp.23-44. 
11 Scholars that note this include McEvoy-Levy, “Introduction: Youth and the Post-Accord Environment,” in 
Siobhan McEvoy-Levy (ed) Troublemakers or Peacemakers? Youth and Post-Accord Peacebuilding (Notre Dame, 
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006): p.19; Caitlin Mollica, “The diversity of identity: youth participation at 
the Solomon Islands Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 71, no.4 
(2017): p.377. 
12 Reference made to the Aristophanic diatribes. Freeman, pp.72-74. 
13 Siobhan McEvoy-Levy, “Introduction: Youth and the Post-Accord Environment,” p.3; Scholars such as Gunnar 
Heinsohn have been keen to draw connections between the “youth bulge” and instances of violence and social 
unrest. Gunnar Heinsohn, Söhne und Weltmacht: Terror im Aufstieg und Fall der Nationen [Sons and World Power: 
Terror in the Rise and Fall of Nations] (Berlin: Orell Fussli, 2006): pp.52-54. 
14 Pierre Bourdieu, “‘Youth’ is just a word,” in Sociology in Question (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1993): p.95.  
15 United Nations, ‘Report of the Advisory Committee for the International Youth Year,’ A/36/215, annex; UN 
Security Council, Security Council resolution 2250 (2015) [on youth, peace and security], 18 March 2016, 
S/RES/2250 (2015), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/56ebfd654.html [accessed 21 February 2019]; UN 
Habitat, “Urban Youth Fund,” https://unhabitat.org/urban-initiatives/initiatives-programmes/urban-youth-fund/  
[accessed 21 February 2019].  
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determine whether or not one sees oneself, or is seen by others,  as “young”. Further to Bourdieu’s 
indication of a sense of social “struggle between the young and the old”, Alcinda Honwana has 
suggested that the experience of youth is one of “waithood” – a period of transition from childhood 
to adulthood and a more secure place in society.16 There is thus a critical interaction to be explored 
between a social group that may define itself by its own sense of struggle and transition within a 
wider societal process of transition towards justice.17 
Of the world regions that is most consumed with the question of “youth” – what “youth” 
is, what young people want, and how young people behave – is the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region, where youth population figures reach 65 percent.18 In light of rampant youth 
unemployment rates, a widespread sense of cultural difference among generations, and the 
popularity of conversations on Islamism and radicalism, young people in the region have most 
commonly become subjects of debates on “the youth challenge”, “the youth bulge”, and “youth 
radicalisation”.19 Despite leading many of the revolutionary protest movements of the “Arab 
Spring”, young people have remained categorised as a problem to be solved rather than those at 
the forefront of problem-solving. These narratives have even prevailed over much of the analysis 
surrounding the “success story” of the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings and the region’s so-called 
 
16 Alcinda Honwana, Youth and revolution in Tunisia, (New York: Zed Books, 2013): p.12. 
17 In light of the tendency to categorise young people as a single entity, this thesis does not utilise youth as a 
common noun, apart from when referencing others’ use of the term in this manner, in which case it appears as 
“youth”. Thus, this thesis does not refer to youths, but seeks to reorient discussions on “youth” as young people in 
order to direct conversation towards the multifaceted nature of this category of human beings. “Youth” will be used 
as an abstract noun to describe this period of life, and will thus appear in association with another noun, for example 
“youth activist, “youth issue”, or “youth movement”, in order to describe the nature of that noun in its relation to 
“youth” as a social group identity.  
18 Kristin Lord, “Here Come the Young,” Foreign Policy, 12 August 2016, available at 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/12/here-comes-the-young-youth-bulge-demographics/ [accessed 21 July 2019];  
19 Navtej Dhillon, “Middle East Youth Bulge: Challenge or Opportunity?”, Brookings Institution, 22 May 2008, 
available at https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/middle-east-youth-bulge-challenge-or-opportunity/ [accessed 
26 July 2019]; Mario Abou Zeid, Lars Erslev Andersen, Tobias Gemmerlie, Jorgen Ilim, Natascha Jensen, Lina 
Khatib, “Youth Radicalization and Security,” Carnegie Middle East Center, 19 March 2015, available at 
https://carnegie-mec.org/2015/03/19/youth-radicalization-and-security-pub-59588 [accessed 5 September 2019].  
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“beacon of hope”, Tunisia.20 Young Tunisians were credited with leading a revolution that 
removed President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali from power and sought to establish a new Tunisian 
republic built on human rights after a period of post-colonial dictatorships; however, low youth 
voter turnout rates and few signs of formal political participation have led to the widespread 
conviction that young Tunisians are disengaged from and simply disinterested in the 
democratisation process.21  
The same sentiments, if not more so, arise amongst the narratives surrounding young 
Tunisians’ interests in transitional justice. Following previous models from Latin America and 
South Africa, Tunisia set out a formal transitional justice process in 2013 to be spearheaded by a 
truth commission, the Truth and Dignity Commission (TDC), which has been, arguably, the 
leading subject of contention and discussion for practitioners and scholars.22 With a continued 
focus on a state-mandated process from the top down, theories of transitional justice from the 
bottom up and discussions on the roles of a range of marginalised communities have been widely 
neglected.23 Marked by generational tensions before, during, and after the revolution, Tunisia 
nonetheless offers a uniquely important case study to explore the roles that can be played by young 
people in transitional justice. Furthermore, as a case that is setting legal, political, and social 
precedent in the MENA region and is providing another testing ground for the transitional justice 
 
20 Mark Goldberg, “How Tunisia Became the Only Real Arab Spring Success Story,” Global Dispatches, 26 
October 2017, available at http://www.globaldispatchespodcast.com/how-tunisia-became-the-only-real-arab-spring-
success-story/ [accessed 25 April 2019]; Noha Aboueldahab, “Unrest in Tunisia: Another turning point in a legacy 
of economic injustice,” Brookings Institution, 29 January 2018, available at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-
from-chaos/2018/01/29/unrest-in-tunisia-another-turning-point-in-a-legacy-of-economic-injustice/ [accessed 25 
April 2019].   
21 Sarah Yerkes, “Where Have All the Revolutionaries Gone?” Brookings Institution (2007): p.45, available at 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/cmep_20160317_where_have_revolutionaries_gone.pdf [ 
accessed 25 April 2019].  
22 The TDC was mandated by the state with the passing of the Transitional Justice Law in 2013. See Republic of 
Tunisia, “Organic Law on Establishing and Organizing Transitional Justice,” via OHCHR, adopted 15 December 
2013, p.1, available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/TN/TransitionalJusticeTunisia.pdf [accessed 5 
September 2019]. 
23 This will be discussed further in the following chapters. 
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field more broadly, the Tunisian experience provides another key testing ground for the evolution 
of transitional justice theories. 24   
Theorising a Role for Youth Activism in Transitional Justice 
Examining the Tunisian case within debates on transitional justice, this thesis serves to 
address the prevalent disregard towards the role played by young people in such processes. 
Considering specifically the efforts of Tunisian youth activists, the thesis addresses several 
interrelated questions: To what extent have young Tunisians, broadly, had a particular vision of 
“justice” in the transitional context? To what extent were young Tunisians involved in the formal 
transitional justice process? In what ways have youth activists mobilised in pursuit of their notions 
of justice? and How have those methods of mobilisation affected the pursuit of “justice” in the 
transitional context? The thesis argues that, as young people are marginalised from the official 
processes of transitional justice, they actively seek and offer alternative approaches that are critical 
to a much broader, societal project of pursuing transitional justice from the bottom up. From their 
experiences of marginalisation arise a distinct group youth interest in sweeping social change and 
a command of informal civic spaces and tools through which youth activists can re-imagine truth 
and justice and provide accessible ways for broader societal engagement with the concrete issues 
at the heart of transitional justice. 
The analysis draws from qualitative data gathered through fourteen in-depth interviews on 
the subject of youth engagement with transitional justice, as well as broader ethnographic 
observations from field research conducted in Tunisia from June and July of 2019. Interviews were 
conducted mostly with “youth activists” – either currently identifying as “youth” or during 
 
24 Noha Aboueldahab, “Navigating the Storm: Civil Society and Ambiguous Transitions in Egypt, Libya and 
Tunisia,” in Jasmina Brankovic and Hugo van der Merwe (eds), Advocating Transitional Justice in Africa: The Role 
of Civil Society (New York: Springer, 2018): p.202.  
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previous periods of the transition – and with non-youth members of international and national civil 
society, as well as members of the official transitional justice process.25 Cognisant of a general 
association of youth with masculinity and seeking to explore the intersectionality of youth 
activism, the study sought to balance the sample of interviews by gender, both among youth 
activists and in total.26 The sample of interviews is limited in number but includes perspectives 
from a wide range of organisations and activist associations, with no two interviewees from the 
same civil society organisation. One interviewee is cited anonymously. Almost all interviewees 
were based in Tunis. Many interview subjects noted the centralisation of the national transitional 
justice process to the capital city, as well as the significance of Tunis for youth activism due to the 
size of the student population.27 To gain broader insights into the questions of youth dynamics and 
youth agency, as individuals and as a group, and to cross reference the information of interviews, 
the study also involved ethnographic observations through  informal conversations in everyday 
settings; observations and photographs of social dynamics and public spaces, particularly in 
relation to the streets and public art; as well as participation in a workshop that brought young 
Tunisians from across the country to discuss how young Tunisians are affecting and being affected 
by global change.28 Though limited in scope, the interview sample and ethnographic observations 
shed important new light on the justice sought by young Tunisians in the transitional context of 
 
25 As will be further discussed, youth identity appears quite fluid and context-dependent, therefore the number of 
“youth” versus “non-youth” interviewees cannot be exactly calculated.  
26 Five of the ten activists most closely identifying with “youth” were women. For further information on association 
of youth with masculinity, see Erica Burman, “Innocents abroad: Western fantasies of childhood and the 
iconography of emergencies,” Disasters 18, no.3 (1994), p.244.  
27 Although many interviewees were based in Tunis but originally from southern and interior regions, the lack of 
representation of interviewees who are active in the marginalised interior regions of the country indicates a limit to 
the scope of the study. 
28 Columbia University’s Committee on Global Thought and the Columbia Global Centers, “Youth in a Changing 
World – Tunis” (workshop, Youth in a Changing World, Tunis, Tunisia, 23 June 2019). 
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recent years and the ways in which they have demonstrated a uniquely youthful agency in seeking 
to realise their visions of transitional justice. 
To explore a relationship between youth activism and transitional justice,  the first chapter 
of this thesis serves to trace the conceptual growth of the transitional justice field and to highlight 
the evolution of key scholarly theories and debates, including the academic literature on the 
concept of transitional justice from the bottom up and the capabilities of young people in the field 
of peacebuilding. The second chapter then sets the scene of the Tunisian case, describing the 
aftermath of the revolution and the situation of young people in this period. The chapter includes 
data collected from interviews on how young Tunisians conceptualise “youth” and envision 
“justice” in the transitional context. Drawing parallels between the Manich Msamah (“I Will Not 
Forgive”) campaign and other youth-led protest movements, the third chapter explores youth 
activists’ command of the street as an important civic space for truth-telling, justice-seeking, and 
the imagination of a changed society. In close connection, the fourth chapter examines the 
messages of youth street art and the work of an intergenerational unofficial truth project, Voices 
of Memory, indicating the ways in which young Tunisians have brought distinctly creative 
approaches to storytelling, truth-telling, and memory preservation. Finally, the conclusion revisits 
the main contributions of this thesis and positions the analysis of the Tunisian case amongst other 
cases of transitional justice in order to support the theory of youth activists’ importance in bottom-
up transitional justice. More broadly, the conclusion serves to provide some critical areas for re-
evaluation in the fields of youth and transitional justice and to indicate ways forward for further 







A Youth Lens on Theories of Transitional Justice 
 
 
...youths were often the instruments of oppression, acting as vicious thugs to influence the 
outcomes of elections and put down anti-government demonstrations. In times of 
transition, Sierra Leone’s youth has always struggled to find its rightful place in society. 
 
–  Final Report of Sierra Leon’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission.29  
 
 
[T]hose who grew up under conditions of violence will carry traces of their experiences 
into adulthood … the period of struggle also nurtured resilience, wisdom, leadership and 
tolerance … Many of these young people have become men and women of extraordinary 
calibre. Despite their suffering, they have shown extraordinary generosity and tolerance 
and have reached out to their former oppressors in a spirit of reconciliation. 
 
–  Final Report of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission.30 
 
 
The Rise of Transitional Justice Norms and Institutions 
 Promoting “transitional justice” as a “distinct conception of law and justice in the context 
of political transformation”, Ruti Teitel is often credited with coining the term in the 1990s.31 
Alongside other pioneers in the field, the Argentinian human rights lawyer and scholar has since 
become a leading authority on the development of theories and best practices associated with the 
concept that, having been of an “exceptional and international” nature with the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo trials after the Second World War, became a modern “norm” with the transitions in Latin 
America and Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s.32 In line with Teitel’s hypothesis that, “[i]n 
modern political transformation, it is through legal practices that successor societies make 
 
29 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, Witness to Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, Volume 3B (Accra, Ghana: Graphic Packaging Ltd, 2004): p.343. 
30 South Africa, Volume Four: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (Cape Town, 1999): pp. 
278-279.  
31 Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997): p.4. 
32 Teitel, Globalizing Transitional Justice, p.4. 
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liberalizing political change”, the transitional justice field has since adopted a keen focus on 
institutional and judicial procedures to answer the question of how societies might grapple with 
histories of human rights violations and turn the page towards liberal democracy.33 Alongside the 
institutional emergence of the ICC and the respective international criminal tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, “norms” of transitional justice, such as the right to the truth and the right 
to a remedy and reparation, have been further codified in international human rights law.34 
Through the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN has engaged on the 
subject of “transitional justice and the rule of law” since 2004, with the release of reports of the 
UN Secretary-General.35 While “transitional justice” has, in theory and concept, retained a broad 
meaning − with a range of interpretations among scholars, practitioners, and local stakeholders − 
the field has repeatedly shown in practice a predisposition towards particular institutional models 
to lead official processes.36 
 From Chile to South Africa and now Tunisia, truth commissions − often named truth and 
reconciliation commissions (TRCs) − have become arguably the most popular mechanism to 
reveal histories of human rights violations and to pave a way forward to a more just future, 
 
33 Teitel, Transitional Justice, p.221; Arthur, p.321. 
34 Teitel, Globalizing Transitional Justice, p.7; UN General Assembly, “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law,” UN General Assembly, resolution 60/147, 16 December 2005, 
available at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/RemedyAndReparation.aspx [accessed 24 July 
2019]. 
35 The UN Secretary-General’s report defines “transitional justice” as “the full range of processes and mechanisms 
associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure 
accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial 
mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions, 
reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof.” United Nations 
Secretary-General, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies,” United 
Nations Security Council S/2004/616, 23 August 2004, available at http://archive.ipu.org/splz-e/unga07/law.pdf 
[accessed 24 July 2019]. 
36 For Gready and Robins, “the mainstream definition of transitional justice has four pillars: criminal prosecutions, 
truth commissions, reparations and institutional reform” with a “focus on institutions, top-down state interventions 
and the law”. Paul Gready and Simon Robins, “Rethinking Civil Society and Transitional Justice: Lessons from 
Social Movements and ‘new’ Civil Society',” The International Journal of Human Rights (2017): p.956. 
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prompting many scholarly examinations into their efficacy.37 Drawing from a diverse range of 
cases and experiences, Priscilla Hayner has outlined key challenges and limitations of truth and 
reconciliation commissions, emphasising that the truth-seeking bodies cannot replace trials; that 
expectations often exceed the achievements that are possible; and, critically, that truth and 
reconciliation may not necessarily be compatible objectives.38 To encourage realistic 
understandings of what TRCs can achieve, Michael Ignatieff has warned: “all that a truth 
commission can achieve is to reduce the number of lies that can be circulated unchallenged in public 
discourse”.39 These expressions of caution have evidently only become prevalent in certain circles, 
however, as truth commissions have remained a leading prescription for societies seeking to deal with 
the past, giving rise to the concern that “transitional justice” has become characterised by one-size-
fits-all mechanisms and a set of top-down rules and procedures.40 
Theories of Transitional Justice from the Bottom Up 
 
 As legal-institutional approaches to transitional justice had themselves become the “norm”, 
and with limits to their success, scholars have theorised alternative means by which truth and 
justice might otherwise be pursued, particularly by ways that re-orient the focus towards the 
experiences and needs of victims.41 Presenting an important counter-argument to the prevalent 
logic of forgiveness − as embodied by the transitional justice and human rights icon, the chairman 
of the South African TRC, Desmond Tutu − Thomas Brudholm contends that “the preservation of 
outrage or resentment and the refusal to forgive and reconcile can be the reflex expression of a 
moral protest and ambition that might be as permissible and admirable as the posture of 
 
37 Lundy and McGovern, p.270. 
38 Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions (New York: 
Routledge, 2011): pp. 5-6. 
39 Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (New York: Metropolitan 
Books, 1998): p.178. 
40 Lundy and McGovern, “Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice from the Bottom Up,” p.271. 
41 Teitel, Globalizing Transitional Justice, p.4 
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forgiveness.”42  Instead of supporting the theory that forgiveness secures peace and reconciliation, 
Brudholm argues that the emotional testimony of resentment is integral to demanding justice after 
rights have been violated.43 Also drawing lessons from the model South African process, Jill 
Stauffer warns that many existing transitional justice mechanisms not only fail to deliver justice, 
but also fail to meaningfully hear the truths felt by victims.44 Stauffer presents “ethical loneliness” 
as a new discourse that changes the subject of transitional justice debates to focus on the experience 
of not just “dehumanization, oppression, and abandonment but also by the failure of just-minded 
people to hear well”.45  
Seeking to remedy the failures of official transitional justice mechanisms to give victims a 
sense of reclaimed rights, justice, or dignity, a wave of scholarship has sought to explore the merits 
of unofficial mechanisms under the broad theory of transitional justice “from the bottom up”.46 
Louis Bickford has argued that “Unofficial Truth Projects” have unique strengths and certain 
advantages over official TRCs, including ways that might be seen as preserving the right to hold 
onto resentment and address ethical loneliness.47 Looking at projects across several continents, 
Bickford contends that community-level truth-telling allows “voices from below to be heard and 
heeded” and, that in comparison to formal truth commission, unofficial truth projects “may be 
more likely to establish a society-wide dialogue about the past”.48 Informed by fieldwork in 
Northern Ireland, Anna Bryson has suggested that localised oral history projects can serve to 
ensure more victim- and voice-centred approaches to the pursuit of truth and justice in post-conflict 
 
42 Thomas Brudholm, Resentment’s Virtue: Jean Amery and the Refusal to Forgive (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 2008): p.4. 
43 Brudholm, p.10. 
44 Jill Stauffer, Ethical Loneliness: the Injustice of Not Being Heard (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015): 
pp. 31-32. 
45 Ibid.  
46 See Lundy and McGovern. 
47 Louis Bickford, “Unofficial Truth Projects,” Human Rights Quarterly 29, No. 4 (Nov., 2007): p.995. 
48 Ibid.  
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environments.49 Reflecting on the experience of Rwanda, a case popularly highlighted for its local-
level gacaca courts as “traditional” methods of justice-making, Alexander Betts has argued that, 
for transitional justice to succeed, “it must be reoriented towards the community level rather than 
based on the abstractions of legal positivism disembedded from the contexts to which they are 
applied”.50 The effectiveness of a process hinges on interpretations of legitimacy and fairness, 
Betts contends.51  
While scholarship continues to be gripped by binary debates over which models of 
transitional justice – truth commissions or trials; internationally-led or nationally-led mechanisms; 
official or unofficial initiatives – are the most effective, it is important to consider that such 
mechanisms do not need to be mutually exclusive or contradictory.52 John Paul Lederach argues 
that transitions towards a “positive peace” are not generated by the either-or choices normally 
associated with transitional justice; rather, such transitions are “forged by the capacity to generate, 
mobilise, and build the moral imagination.”53 A multifaceted concept that is readily applicable to 
theories of transitional justice and reconciliation, Lederach describes “the moral imagination” as 
requiring several disciplines, capacities, and approaches: 
The moral imagination requires the capacity to imagine ourselves in a web of relationships 
that includes our enemies: the ability to sustain a paradoxical curiosity that embraces 
complexity without reliance on dualistic polarity; the fundamental belief in and pursuit of 
the creative act; and the acceptance of the inherent risk of stepping into the mystery of the 
unknown that lies beyond the far too familiar landscape of violence.54 
 
49 Anna Bryson, “Victims, Violence, and Voice: Transitional Justice, Oral History, and Dealing with the Past,” 
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 39, no.2 (2016): p.305. 
50 Alexander Betts, 'Should Approaches to Post-conflict Justice and Reconciliation be Determined Globally, 
Nationally or Locally?” European Journal of Development Research 17 (2005): p.749. 
51 Ibid.  
52 In the case of the Sierra Leone Memory Project, for example, Joseph Ben Kaifala has argued that unofficial truth 
and memory projects can serve to fill gaps and reveal new silences as extensions of truth commissions. Joseph Ben 
Kaifala, “Transitional Justice in Sierra Leone: Oral History, Human Rights, and Post-Conflict Reconciliation,” Oral 
History Forum d’histoire orale 34 (2014): p.8. 
53 John Paul Lederach, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005): p.5  




In line with this idea of a new societal imagination of morality, Lederach has supported theories 
that inclusion is necessary for a “positive peace” to take hold and that transitional justice processes 
that engage larger sections of a society will be more effective than those that are limited and 
exclusive.55  
Further to the prevalence of the concept of the “moral imagination” in arts and literature, 
Lederach underscores the role of art and creativity in bottom-up transitional justice, describing the 
ways in which art “helps us return to our humanity, a transcendent journey that, like the moral 
imagination, can build a sense that we are, after all, a human community.”56 As has been evidenced 
in Lebanon, for example, debates on a country’s past – including whether to forgive or forget – 
can be moulded by artistic and cultural production, such as films, music, novels, poetry, and even 
street art.57 For Simon Robins and Paul Gready, scholarship should show greater recognition of 
such alternative initiatives and “evolve southward” with broader conceptions of civil society and 
its role in transitional justice.58 In line with Lederach, Gready and Robins argue that a more 
inclusive conception of the roles of “civil society” can itself “help to deliver a transitional justice 
that is more diverse, more accessible, more vibrant and more locally relevant”.59 In contrast to the 
top-down associations of “transitional justice”, they term this more inclusive concept “justice in 
transition”, defined as “‘a broad social project and a condition in society’, and understood as an 
everyday verb, given meaning and made/ remade in the everyday lives of people living in societies 
emerging from conflict.”60  
 
55 Ibid, p.122  
56 Ibid, p.154. 
57 Sune Haugbolle, “Dealing with Lebanon’s past: Remembering, reconciliation, art and activism,” Accord, 24 (June 
2012): pp.15-16. 
58 Gready and Robins, p.971. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid, p.957. 
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In light of these principle-based and practice-motivated directions for transitional justice 
to be more inclusive, scholars have sought to investigate the roles that could and should be played 
by those often most marginalised by formal processes, specifically women, children, and 
refugees.61 The need to engage local communities has been recognised at various institutional 
levels. In 2004, the UN Secretary-General singled out the “situation and role of women” and “the 
situation of children” (but not including the “role of children”) for greater attention going forward 
in work on the rule of law and transitional justice.62 While these directions have been encouraging, 
it has become apparent that scholars, practitioners, and leaders of the international community 
have continued to neglect and disparage a significant social community that has not been 
positioned within the human rights framework: youth. 
Theorising Transitional Justice with a Youth Lens 
 
 A limited interest in the relationship between young people and transitional justice has 
emerged most visibly through two problematic and inter-connected sources, firstly, through a lens 
that conflates childhood and youth, and secondly, through a viewpoint that focuses on youth 
vulnerability to violent conflict. Looking at the role of children and youth in processes of 
transitional justice, Virginie Ladisch traces the inclusion of children’s perspectives in chapters of 
reports by the truth commissions in Guatemala and Peru; the hearings of adults working with 
children in South Africa; and then later as participants in hearings in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and 
Kenya.63 As reflected by the epigraphs of this chapter from the final reports of the TRCs of South 
 
61 See Backer, pp. 297–313; Bell and O’Rourke, pp.23-44; Huma Haider, “Transnational Transitional Justice and 
Reconciliation: The Participation of Conflict-Generated Diasporas in Addressing the Legacies of Mass Violence,” 
Journal of Refugee Studies 27, no.2 (2014): pp.207–233; Sharanjeet Parmar, Jane Roseman, Saudamini Siegrist, and 
Theo Sowa (eds), Children and Transitional Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
62 UN Secretary General, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies”, p.6. 
63 Virginie Ladisch, “Children and youth participation in transitional justice processes,” Journal of Childhood and 
Youth 6, no.3 (2013): pp.503-513. 
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Africa and Sierra Leone, “youth” have either remained tied to associations with children and 
victimhood and praised for their “wisdom”, “tolerance”, and “forgiveness”, or they have been 
labelled as violent and “vicious thugs”, who have “struggled to find their rightful place in 
society”.64 Clearly, young people continue to struggle to find a rightful and more just place in the 
transitional justice literature also. 
 Unsurprisingly, as a social group that is commonly branded as “disaffected”, “feckless”, 
and “out of control”, “youth” arise more commonly in literature on “peacebuilding” than under the 
header of “transitional justice”.65 Underscoring that a “neglect of adolescents and older young 
people is shortsighted and counterproductive in terms of peace building”, Siobhan McEvoy-Levy 
has sought to direct greater attention towards the roles of young people as both “troublemakers” 
and as “peacemakers”.66 Despite often failing to surpass the conflation of youth and children, 
scholarship has pointed to young people’s uniquely-placed positions to catalyse peace efforts 
through education, storytelling, activism, and community-based rituals of reconciliation.67 In light 
of the fact that “[m]uch less has been written about youth peace builders than about youth soldiers”, 
scholarship has indicated that young people have a distinct peacebuilding potential “in their critical 
questioning of the status quo”; in their more natural “incentive to push for change”; as the frequent 
“vanguard of social movements”; and in their predilection towards storytelling and creative and 
collective culture building.68 These characteristics of youth activism give rise to a hypothesis that 
 
64 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, p.343; South Africa, pp. 278-279.  
65 Richard Hill and Judith Bessant, “Spaced‐out? Young people's agency, resistance and public space,” Urban Policy 
and Research, 17, no.1 (1999): p.32. 
66 Siobhan McEvoy-Levy, “Youth as Social and Political Agents: Issues in Post-Settlement Peace Building”, Kroc 
Institute Occasional Papers, 21 (2001), pp.2-3; Siobhan McEvoy-Levy, “Introduction: Youth and the Post-Accord 
Environment,” pp.1-26. 
67 Siobhan McEboy-Levy, “Conclusion: Youth and Post-Accord Peace Building,” in Siobhan McEvoy-Levy (ed)  
Troublemakers or Peacemakers? Youth and Post-Accord Peacebuilding (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2006): p.287. 
68 Siobhan McEvoy-Levy, “Politics, Protest, and Local “Power Sharing” in North Belfast,” in Troublemakers or 
Peacemakers? Youth and Post-Accord Peacebuilding (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006): 
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youth activism might be a particularly force behind the “moral imagination” and a broader social 
project of “justice in transition”, yet scholarly analysis of the connection remains limited.69  
Of the few explorations of the role of young people in processes of transitional justice, 
Cailin Mollica has  sought to combat the depictions of youth on either side of the victim-perpetrator 
binary and, drawing from the case of the Solomon Islands Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
has presented an important contribution on the ways “youth have the capability to shape 
transitional justice in innovative and forward-looking ways”.70 Nevertheless, with the limited 
scope of the study and its exclusive focus on the role of young people within the work of the truth 
commission, Mollica’s work should prompt further questions on the distinct abilities of youth 
transitional justice actors, both inside and outside of an official process.71 
 Positioned within these scholarly theories and re-conceptions of transitional justice bottom 
up, involving unofficial mechanisms and the inclusion of marginalised communities, this 
exploration of the Tunisian case builds on and contributes to the literature on the question of 
whether young people, specifically youth activists, pose unique capabilities that might help 
societies meet its objectives of transition and justice. In light of scholarship on the way in which 
“transitional justice” debates have so often excluded the recognition of certain mechanisms and 
communities, this thesis actively addresses preconceptions of both “transitional justice” and 
“youth”. As “youth” and “youths” are often ascribed particular characteristics, including 
associations with masculinity and as a homogenous group, this examination of youth agency takes 
 
p.141; Jeff Helsing, with Namik Kirlic, Neil McMaster, and Nir Sonnenschein, “Young People’s Activism and the 
Transition to Peace: Bosnia, Northern Ireland, and Israel,” in Troublemakers or Peacemakers? Youth and Post-
Accord Peacebuilding (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006): p.197; Jessica Senehi and Sean 
Byrne, “From Violence Toward Peace: the Role of Storytelling for Youth Healing and Political Empowerment after 
Social Conflict,” in Troublemakers or Peacemakers? Youth and Post-Accord Peacebuilding (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2006): pp.236 and 252.  
69 Lederach, p.5; Gready and Robins, p.957. 




into active consideration a much-needed intersectional lens that transcends the prevailing single-
axis analysis of “youth”, noting the intersection of gender and youth where relevant.72 Similarly, 
the thesis utilises a range of concepts − including signs of “ethical loneliness”, the display of 
“resentment”, the forces of “justice in transition”, and the pursuit of “the moral imagination” – to 
capture in a more accurate and balanced fashion the range of factors, sentiments, and experiences 





























72 On “intersectionality”, see Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,” The University of Chicago 
Legal Forum, 8, no.1 (1989): pp.139-167; and Sumi Cho, Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw and Leslie McCall, 
“Toward a Field of Intersectionality Studies: Theory, Applications, and Praxis,” Signs, 38, no. 4 (Summer 2013): 
pp.785-810. 
73 Stauffer pp.31-32; Brudholm, p.4; Robbins and Gready, p.957; Lederach, The Moral Imagination: The Art and 





 “Youth”, “Justice”, and “Transition”: The Case of Tunisia 
 
 
Beware, for below the ash there is fire,  
And he who grows thorns reaps wounds.  
Look there, for I have harvested the heads of mankind  
and the flowers of hope,  
and I watered the heart of the earth with blood.  
 
– Abu Al-Qasem Al-Shabi, “To The Tyrants of the World”.74 
 
 
From “Revolutionaries” to “Disillusioned”: A Narration of Two Youths 
As a rallying cry that was heard across the MENA region during the “Arab Spring” protests 
of 2010 and 2011, the enduring expression of an early twentieth century Tunisian “to the tyrants 
of the world”, and a youthful promise of retribution and a new dawn for society, these sentiments 
of the young Tunisian poet Abu Al-Qasem Al-Shabi embody many of the ways in which Tunisia 
provides a uniquely important case for the questions of youth, justice, and transition.75 As a country 
setting legal, political, and social precedent for the MENA region and one that is seen moving 
against the “global retreat from human rights”, what does Tunisia demonstrate with regards to the 
forces that support and undermine the pursuit of justice in transition?76 As a process that has 
adopted the international model of a truth commission to lead a state-mandated effort, how does 
 
74 Abu El-Qasem Al-Shabi,“To The Tyrants of the World”, translated by Adel Iskandar. See Pierre Joris, Habib 
Tengour (eds), Poems for the Millennium, Volume Four: The University of California Book of North African 
Literature (University of California Press, January 2013): p.283. 
75 National Public Radio, “Tunisian Poet's Verses Inspire Arab Protesters,” 30 January 2013, available at 
https://www.npr.org/2011/01/30/133354601/Tunisian-Poets-Verses-Inspire-Arab-Protesters [accessed 30 July 
2019].  
76 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Taking on the past: the Tunisian Truth and Dignity 
Commission,” 9 June 2014, available at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/TakingOnThePast.aspx 
[accessed 30 July 2019]; Colum Lynch, “U.N. Human Rights Chief to Leave, Citing ‘Appalling’ Climate for 
Advocacy,” Foreign Policy, 20 December 2017, available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/20/u-n-human-




the Tunisian experience test prevailing theories of transitional justice? As a revolution wherein 
young people played leading roles, how, if at all, has Tunisia’s pursuit of justice in the transitional 
context been affected by the efforts of youth activists? 
That “youth” were at the forefront of the revolution that ousted President Zine al-Abidine 
Ben Ali from power on 14 January 2011 has been recorded widely.77 Statistics indicate that thirty 
five percent of the protestors were under the age of twenty four and that sixty percent were under 
thirty five.78 Young people have not just been remembered amongst the crowds but also as the 
“trailblazers” of the revolutionary movement that was sparked by the self-immolation of Mohamed 
Bouazizi and spurred on by bloggers such as Lina Ben Mhenni (A Tunisian Girl).79 In Tunisia, 14 
January is now celebrated  annually as “Revolution and Youth Day”, whilst internationally, the 
role of young Tunisians in the “Arab Spring” has been recorded alongside other nation-defining 
histories of youth activism, from the civil rights activism in the United States to the anti-apartheid 
movement in South Africa.80 
While scholars, commentators and national politicians have bestowed common praise on 
the country’s “youth” for their role in leading the revolution, the influence of young Tunisians in 
the aftermath has been remarkably quickly dismissed. Recounting the Tunisian experience of 
democratisation, Safwan Masri has written that “[a]lthough they, in many respects, led the 
 
77 Angelique Chrisafis and Ian Black, “Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali forced to flee Tunisia as protesters claim victory,” 
The Guardian, 15 January 2011, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/14/tunisian-president-
flees-country-protests [accessed 30 July 2019].  
78 Safwan Masri, Tunisia: An Arab Anomaly (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), p.42; Sarah Yerkes, 
“Where Have All the Revolutionaries Gone?” Brookings Institution (2007): p.27, available at 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/cmep_20160317_where_have_revolutionaries_gone.pdf 
[accessed 25 April 2019].   
79 Masri, p.44. 
80 Siyka Kovacheva, Boris Popivanov and Stanimir Kabaivanov, “Youth Policy in Arab Mediterranean Countries in 
A Comparative Perspective,” SAHWA, Policy Report, 2017, p.16; Virginie Ladisch, “A Catalyst for Change: 
Engaging Youth in Transitional Justice,” International Center for Transitional Justice, Briefing paper, April 2018, 




revolution, the youth were not organised nor united enough after the revolution to lead the political 
discourse or provide a viable alternative path for the transition.”81 Amidst the turbulent transition 
from the fall of Ben Ali in early 2011 to the country’s first free presidential election in 2014 – a 
period that saw power handed between four presidents and five prime ministers; two high-profile 
political assassinations; and attacks on tourist sites –Tunisian “youth” were quickly categorised as 
“the disillusioned”, “the disaffected” and “the disinterested” without the know-how or drive to 
generate the change they sought.82 Writing two years after the revolution, Nur Laiq captures the 
depreciation of young people’s value in the context of the transition with the conclusion in 
“Talking to Arab Youth” that “[w]hether they [youth] have the political savvy and the stamina to 
drive the transition processes and to fulfil the promises of the revolution remains to be seen”.83 By 
reducing youth agency to a lack of “political savvy”, “stamina”, and unity, scholarship has all too 
often reflected widely held stereotypes on the inabilities of young people or “youth” as a single 
homogenous entity.84 It is important to again underscore that, to avoid the broad generalisations 
on “youth”, this study explores the specific efforts of “youth activists” or “young activists” in 
relation to transitional justice and does not profess to examine how young people, in general, might 
engage with transitional justice.85 As exemplified by Laiq and Masri, scholars and commentators 
 
81 Masri, p.54. 
82 Ibid; Mischa Benoit-Lavelle, “How Will Tunisia Respond to the Bardo Museum Attack?”, The New Yorker, 19 
March 2015, available at https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-will-tunisia-respond-to-the-bardo-
museum-attack [accessed 1 August 2019];  Zouhir Gabsi, “Tunisia’s youth: awakened identity and challenges post-
Arab Spring,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 46, no. 1 (2019): p.83. 
83 Nur Laiq, Talking to Arab Youth: Revolution and Counterrevolution in Egypt and Tunisia (New York: 
International Peace Institute, 2013): p.76. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Over a third of interviewees noted that there are young people and populations that either show little interest in the 
transitional justice process or have mobilised against the transitional justice process. Aymen Boughanmi, a young 
academic at Kairouan University, stressed that “some forces tried to use young people as a force against transitional 
justice.” Similarly, Mounir Saidani, a professor researching youth issues, said that there is an important distinction 
to be drawn between the many young people who are “not interested” in transitional justice and the young 
revolutionaries seeking social change. Aymen Boughanmi, interview with author, Tunis, Tunisia, 21 June 2019. 
Mounir Saidani, interview with author, Tunis, Tunisia, 2 July 2019.  
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regularly paint “youth” with a broad brush whilst focussing on political participation as the single 
measure of agency and neglecting the intricate questions of what it truly means to be “young” in a 
society, what young activists might want from a revolution or a transition, and how they might 
behave in pursuit of those objectives.86 By using qualitative data from interviews with youth 
activists, this thesis addresses these questions as its starting point for the examination of youth 
agency in the even more complex social, political and legal contestations at the heart of 
“transitional justice”.  
The Meanings of “Youth” from the Eyes of the Young  
 
 “From Hannibal to Mohamed Bouazizi...we have youth that made something good for this 
country”, said Bechir Jouini, a youth activist, emphasising in the interview that young Tunisians 
have regularly been pivotal leaders in times of conflict.87 Further to Pierre Bourdieu’s 
understanding of youth as a population that is “socially constructed in the struggle between the 
young and the old”, interviews with youth activists reveal a particularly emphatic and timeless 
association of youth with forms of socio-political struggle.88 While the majority of respondents 
made some reference to age-specific definitions of youth – often pointing to either a maximum age 
of 35 or 40 years old, to qualify as “young” – it was regularly indicated that these age-related 
definitions had been set by others, such as state institutions or by “international age norms”.89 For 
youth activists, their own understandings of what it means to be “young” related most often to 
socio-political context, and frequently to the revolution and the pursuit of change as an issue of 
 
86 In “Talking to Arab Youth”, Laiq does explore youth identity in relation to activist youth movements, but still 
reflects the popular concentration on political participation as the single measure of agency. See Laiq, pp.4-5 and 
p.76. 
87 Professionally, Jouini is a translator and researcher on international relations. Bechir Jouini, interview by author, 
Tunis, Tunisia, 15 June 2019. 
88 Bourdieu, p.95. 
89 See Table 1, below. 
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generational struggle and a source of identity.90 Reflecting a widely held sentiment among those 
who were active during the revolution, Youssef Cherif, a political analyst, explained that he felt 
himself to be “exactly the same person [as] in 2011, be it in age, in mind, in everything”.91 This 
sentiment supported the idea of a “generation” of younger revolutionaries, whose collective 
identity appeared to be built in opposition to an “old” state system, politicians, and “political 
ideologies”.92 Table 1, below, captures the main responses of ten respondents relating to the 
meaning of “youth” in Tunisia. Following a general pattern of sequenced responses in this way, 
the table reflects, firstly, any numerical age-related definition given; secondly, any caveats used 
with regard to that definition; and, thirdly, some of the most prominent sentiments used to describe 
the meaning of “youth” in Tunisia.93 





Caveat to age 




"Youth, as a generation after 2011, were less bound by 
ideology";  
"To be a young person is to want to fulfil yourself";  
There is a "difference in values" between the generations; 
Being young is “connected with freedom". 
2 35 
From perspective of 
Tunisian society 
"Most of the youth in Tunisia make the relation between their 
own age and the revolution"; 
People talk about "the youth of the revolution". 
3 35 
Set by "international 
age norms" 
“[T]hey are more optimistic than old people”; 
“Young people believe in change”; 
Being subject to "deception" and "exclusion";  
"[Y]oung people were really disappointed" with a "president 




91 Youssef Cherif, interview by author, Tunisia, Tunisia, 30 July 2019. Cherif is head of Columbia Global Centers, 
Tunis. From 2011 to 2013, Cherif was part of the World Economic Forum’s “Global Shapers” – “a network of 
young people driving dialogue, action and change.” Global Shapers, “The power of youth in action,” available at 
https://www.globalshapers.org/ [accessed 6 September 2019]. 
92 See Table 1. 
93 The table does not reflect all sentiments described, but reflects the clearest, most emphasised points made by 
respondents. The ten respondents do not all identify as “youth activists”; however, the ten responses reflected here 
are those most closely related at the time to “youth”, either recently or currently identifying as “young”, or working 




Those not between 
18-40 can still be 
"young" 
"[W]e still have the critical eye";  
"[W]e don't have huge responsibilities"; 
To be young is “to have the "freedom to not compromise"; 
"[W]e don't have stable jobs...that's damage"; 
[T]hat's the problem with this generation: everything is 
deceptive"; 
"Our depression is our war". 
5  
Mentioned that no-
one in the “youth-led 
organisation” was 
over 40. 
"...[I]t's a youth organisation because [it was] born after the 
revolution"; 
The state "was very purposefully stigmatising young people"; 





Each raised in 
relation to 
professional context 
With regard to politics, "if you are less than 50 years old, you 
are young";  
"[I]f you are talking generally about your real life... 
adolescence to 35, 40 years old". 




"Even [if] you are 45 years and you are not married, you are 
still young"; 
"it's social things"; 
"[Y]oung Tunisian people are so optimistic"; 





"[A]s a young Tunisia… I haven't lived under dictatorship, 
actually I haven't been oppressed by the old regime, directly at 
least"; 
Younger activists care about "freedom of conscience", rather 




"I still feel myself today in 2019 as exactly the same person as 
in 2011, be it in age, in mind, in everything"; 
After 2011 appears to me as a continuity of one thing". 
 
The national sense of a Tunisian youth struggle against the state system is nothing new; 
rather, it is rooted in a history of socio-political and socio-economic marginalisation.94 Student 
movements had mobilised in the 1970s, for example, under the slogan “educated or not, the future 
is not ours”.95 They were met with systematic torture, arbitrary arrest, censorship, and 
harassment.96 In the decade leading up to the removal of Ben Ali, unemployment had reached 
around fourteen percent on aggregate, but around thirty percent for young Tunisians, and at the 
 
94 Larbi Sadiki, “Regional development in Tunisia: The consequences of multiple marginalization,” Brookings 
Institution, 14 January 2019, available at https://www.brookings.edu/research/regional-development-in-tunisia-the-
consequences-of-multiple-marginalization/ [accessed 1 August 2019]; The World Bank Group, Tunisia: Breaking 
The Barriers to Youth Inclusion (Washington DC: The World Bank Group, 2014): p. xiv.  




close of 2010, unemployment had reached fifty percent for those holding technical degrees and 
master’s degrees.97 In line with this history of abuse and hardship, interviews from this study 
reflected a number of perceptions of the systematic marginalisation, stigmatisation, and exclusion 
of young people.98 Discussing young Tunisians’ sense of place in society, Nesrine Jelalia, 
Executive Director of the youth-led watchdog organisation Al Bawsala, said: “We have been living 
under dictatorship that was very purposefully stigmatising young people. I remember when I was 
an adolescent under the Ben Ali regime, I got the idea, and that was systemic, that I was a burden 
for the state.”99 Heythem Guesmi, a young activist and campaigner, described the “deception” at 
the heart of young people not being able to find steady work, noting the “damage” caused by 
unreliable access to a range of foods.100 “[W]e were raised by people who had hope and we didn’t 
find that hope”, he said, indicating that a feeling of “depression” arose from this sense of 
generational inequality.101 The vulnerability of young people to economic hardship, specifically, 
arose as a prominent these across interviews and in ethnographic observations.102 Their 
experiences are not unique as young Tunisians. According to the Independent Progress Study on 
Youth, Peace and Security, there is a global trend of youth exclusion and marginalisation − “a 
form of structural and psychological violence that is deeply rooted in the reciprocal mistrust 
between young people, their governments and the multilateral system.”103 
 
97 Masri, p.34. 
98 See Table 1, respondents 3, 4, and 5. 
99 Nesrine Jelalia, interview with author, Tunis, Tunisia, 19 June 2019. 
100 Guesmi is also a leading member of the Manich Msamah (“I Will Not Forgive”) campaign, which will be 
discussed further, and has also worked with a number of NGOs, including the Tunisian Forum for Social and 
Economic Rights. Heythem Guesmi, interview with author, Tunis, Tunisia, 18 June 2019.  
101 Ibid. 
102 See Table 1. Economic issues, such as unemployment and the sense of a “brain drain” caused by the mass flight 
of educated young Tunisians arose as prominent themes during the “Youth in a Changing World – Tunis” workshop.  
For more information on youth exclusion from the economic sector, see The World Bank Group, Tunisia: Breaking 
The Barriers to Youth Inclusion, pp. 37-57. 
103 Graeme Simpson, “The missing peace: independent progress study on youth and peace and security,” 
Youth4Peace Global Knowledge Portal (2018) available at https://www.youth4peace.info/ProgressStudy [accessed 
2 August 2019]. 
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Nevertheless, this sense of exclusion did not define what it meant to be a “young” Tunisian 
as experiences of marginalisation also brought about certain unique attributes and characteristics 
that underpin youth activism, according to many interviewees. A number of youth activists 
underscored a sense of “freedom” resulting from their lack of confinement to the social, political, 
and economic centre ground.104 In response to questions on what it means to be young, Khalil 
Arbi, a youth and civil society activist, focused on the unique ways young people freely express 
their desires for self-fulfilment, underscoring that the “spirit of youth is in this [sense of] 
freedom”.105 Similarly, Heythem Guesmi explained that being young involved not having work-
related or financial responsibilities and, therefore, that youthfulness had at its core “the freedom 
and the privilege to not compromise”.106 In a workshop discussion on what it means to be “young”, 
featuring a noticeably younger group of Tunisians, being young was expressed as feelings of 
ambition, hope, innovation, and open-mindedness.107 Unsurprisingly, these socially, 
economically, and politically constructed understandings of “youth” have direct implications for 
young activists’ expectations for the pursuit of “justice” and “transition”. 
Transitional “Justice” from the Eyes of Youth Activists 
 Interviews and ethnographic observations of group settings indicated that young Tunisians 
and youth activists unite behind the pursuit of systemic “change”. Further to signs of a youth 
identity built on feelings of “deception”, a longing for “freedom”, and an intimate connection to 
(the) “revolution”, the goal of “change” arose as a prominent and multidimensional theme in 
responses to questions on the transitional “justice” sought by young Tunisians.108 From “post-
 
104 See Table 1, respondents 1, 4, and 9. 
105 Khalil Arbi, interview with author, Tunisia, Tunisia, 15 June 2019. Arbi is a young academic and has previously 
worked in national civil society. 
106 Heythem Guesmi, interview with author. 
107 “Youth in a Changing World – Tunis” workshop. 
108 See Figure 1. 
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revolutionary institutions” and the “penal code” to “politics and thought” and “mentalities”, youth-
identifying and youth-oriented activists raised “change” in relation to a range of social, political, 
economic, and cultural issues.109  The pursuit of “change” appears as a systematic project and 
process, and one that is fundamental to youth activists’ notions of transition and justice. It is not 
the merely pursuit of a finite objective, such as the reverse of the current situation, rather it involves 
an embrace of “change” as a continual openness to new and different approaches to problem-
solving. A participant in a youth workshop on young Tunisians’ engagement with the rapidly 
changing world described a belief that “change is the only stable factor”.110 This keen embrace of 
“change” seems to arise in direct relation to young people’s sense of identity and opposition to 
formal, hierarchical structures. Mounir Saidani, an academic specialising on issues of youth, 
recounted his own interactions with young Tunisians who, he said, regularly tell him “We are fed 
up. We want change and we want to be free from all forms of authority,” including that of the 
state, of elders, and, from his own experience, teachers.111 Interviews and ethnographic 
observations indicate that the desire for “change” is not simply oppositional, but is also developed 
through uniquely close sense of connection to the outside world, particularly because of new, 
internationally accessible media.112 Responding to the question of how young people see “justice”, 
Hela Boujneh, a youth and transitional justice activist, said:  
young people believe in change; they are more open to what [has] happened in other 
countries; they know there are other models; there is a better life if you get out of Tunisia; 
 
109 Guesmi; Jelalia; Arbi; interviews with author. Khayem Chemli, interview with author, Tunis, Tunisia, 21 June 
2019. Of the ten activists most closely relating to “youth”, seven clearly raised “change” as an objective sought by 
young Tunisians. Calculation generated from transcripts. Documents available with author.   
110 The embrace of, and longing for, change arose prominently in the workshop on “Youth in a Changing World – 
Tunis”. 
111 Mounir Saidani, interview with author. 
112 “We were seeing that in [another] world, through social media, there were other young people living different 
lives”, said Emna Sammari in an interview. Sammari, interview with author, Tunis, Tunisia, 15 July 2019. 
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they are more aware about technology, about modern ways of governance, and they want 
some change… they don’t call it transitional justice.113 
 
As a non-homogenous demographic group with a variety of experiences of injustice along 
multiple intersections of gender, class, religion, ethnicity and more, “justice” can vary widely 
among young Tunisians. In response to questions on the types of “justice” sought by young 
Tunisians, more than one third of interviewees pointed to the central slogans of the revolution, 
such as “work, freedom, and national dignity”, alongside demands for bread and water.114 
Demands for basic social and economic rights were thus at the forefront of the revolution and the 
pursuit of  “dignity” for young Tunisians, according to many respondents.115 Nevertheless, it is 
important to underscore that youth activists’ pursuit of “change” transcended conventional, 
compartmentalised human rights discourse and the dichotomy of social and economic rights and 
civil and political rights.116 In this regard, Khalil Arbi recounted the process of youth philosophy 
“on the idea of change”.117 “It was clear for our generation that the idea of social and economic 
justice was the spark of the movement,” but on the question of how to realise it, Arbi said that 
young people sought “change in politics and thought”, raising the specific issues of corruption, 
censorship, and greater civil freedoms.118  
 
113 Boujneh, interview with author, Skype interview, 16 June 2019. Boujneh is a leading activist in the field of youth 
and transitional justice and administers the Facebook group “Jeunes & Justice Transitionnelle / Tunisie” [“Youth & 
Transitional Justice / Tunisia”]. She was also a participant in Tunisia’s National Dialogue on Transitional Justice 
serving as a regional coordinator for the Sahel transitional justice sectorial commission. 
114 Sarah Yerkes and Zeineb Ben Yahmed, “Tunisians’ Revolutionary Goals Remain Unfulfilled,” Carnegie 
Endowment, 6 December 2018, available at  https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/12/06/tunisians-revolutionary-
goals-remain-unfulfilled-pub-77894 [accessed 1 August 2019]. Data generated from interview transcripts. 
Documents available with author. 
115 “Dignity” was described in relation to employment for one interviewee, and in relation to “confidence in the 
country” for another. Salwa El Gantri, interview with author, Tunis, Tunisia, 14 June 2019. Elyes Ben Sedrine, 
interview with author, Tunis, Tunisia, 18 June 2019.   
116 For further analysis on the interdependence and interrelatedness of economic, social and cultural rights and civil 
and political rights, see  Ioana Cismas, “The Intersection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Civil and 
Political Rights,” in: Eibe Riedel, Gilles Giacca and Christophe Golay (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
in International Law (Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2014),  pp.448-472. 




In connection with the pursuit of systemic change, several youth activists further 
emphasised that the pursuit of accountability, the fight against impunity, and anti-corruption were 
particularly noticeable “youth” issues in Tunisia.119 For example, the non-governmental 
organisations leading civil society’s work on these issues – I-Watch with regards to anti-corruption 
and Al Bawsala on the subject of parliamentary oversight – are distinctly youthful organisations 
that arose after the revolution.120 “[T]he perception for most Tunisian youth is that politics equals 
corruption”, said Youssef Cherif, explaining young, politically active Tunisians’ distance from 
roles in governance.121 While youth-led non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and youth 
activists working on transitional justice express the need for change and accountability in a resolute 
manner, “retribution” did not feature as a form of justice for interviewees, as is claimed by the 
political, financial, and media forces opposed to transitional justice.122. Two young activists 
interviewed explicitly stated that their ultimate vision of “justice” was a sequenced process of 
firstly, ensuring the acknowledgment for past crimes, secondly, for perpetrators to deliver a 
meaningful apology, and finally, for “reconciliation” as the ultimate outcome.123 Similar notions 
were expressed by another interviewee in support of a youth-led campaign for “no reconciliation 
without accountability”.124 A member of the younger generation of Ennahda − the political group 
most accused of seeking “retribution” and excessive financial redress − said that “transitional 
 
119 Reflecting on his interactions with young people in Tunisia, Masri writes that he was regularly asked by young 
Tunisians to write about corruption. Masri, p.76. 
120 Sarah McLewin Kincaid, “Exploring Collaborative Civic Leadership Among Young Tunisians: Inviting Despair, 
Creating Hope,” Digest of Middle East Studies 26, no.1 (2017): p.30. 
121 Cherif, interview with author. 
122 Interviews, media articles, and political debates on transitional justice regularly raise the claim that the Tunisian 
transitional justice process is focused on “revenge” and “retribution”. One interviewee explained that media and 
politicians claimed this was adala intiqamiya (“retributive justice”) rather than adala intiqaliya (“transitional 
justice”). Guesmi, interview with author. 
123 Jouni, interview with author; Anonymous interviewee, interview with author, Tunis, Tunisia, 21 June 2019. 
124 Slogan is from the Manich Msamah “(I Will Not Forgive”) campaign, which is discussed in further detail in 
chapter three. Hiba Ben Haj Khalifa, interview with author, Tunis, Tunisia, 4 July 2019. 
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justice... has to enable people to reconcile… perpetrators and victims are in the same place, 
recognise what happened in this black history, and can move forward.”125 More broadly, more than 
forty percent of respondents – across positions as youth activists, civil society, and those directly 
involved with the formal transitional justice process – raised “reconciliation” as a primary 
objective of any transitional justice process.126 
The Introduction of Transitional Justice to Tunisia 
 
 After the fall of Ben Ali in January 2011, transitional justice-like processes arose almost 
instantly amidst the revolutionary fervour. A Commission on Crimes and Abuses Committed 
During the Revolution explored the period between revolutionary events of December 2010 to the 
first free elections in 2011; an Inquiry Commission on Corruption And Embezzlement sought to 
reveal the truth on these key issues and transmit information to tribunals; and  a Commission for 
Political Reform was formed to oversee legal and constitutional reforms.127 After the completion 
of a National Dialogue on Transitional Justice, a formal state-led process was laid out in the 
Transitional Justice Law of 2013.128 While this study did not limit its examination of youth agency 
with respect to realising the “transitional justice” defined by the state-defined process, the law 
gives a clear indication of the international model adopted by the state and the expectations it was 
setting for the national society. Article 1 of the law outlines the aim of the process to: 
understand and deal with past human rights violations by revealing their truths, and 
holding those responsible accountable, providing reparations for the victims and 
restituting them in order to achieve national reconciliation, preserve and document the 
collective memory, guarantee the nonrecurrence of such violations and transition from an 
 
125 Anonymous interviewee, interview with author. 
126 Calculation generated from interview transcripts; available with author. 
127 Kora Andrieu, “Confronting the Dictatorial Past in Tunisia: Human Rights and the Politics of Victimhood in 
Transitional Justice Discourses Since 2011,” Human Rights Quarterly, 38, no.2 (May 2016): pp.269-271. 
128 Mariam Salehi, “”Droits de l’homme, bien sur: human rights and transitional justice in Tunisia,” in Kurt Mills 




authoritarian state to a democratic system which contributes to consolidating the system 
of human rights.129 
 
The task of spearheading this ambitious task, specifically with the mandate of investigating and 
reporting on past rights violations, providing recommendations for reforms, and issuing 
reparations, fell to the Truth and Dignity Commission (TDC) which operated from 2014 until 
2019.130 Additionally, central parts of the process were to include a Fund for the Dignity and 
Rehabilitation of Victims of Tyranny and the Specialised Criminal Chambers, which are mandated 
to adjudicate gross violations of human rights.131  
 As scholarship has begun to emerge on the transitional process thus far, it is clear to see 
the prevalence of popular and scholarly curiosity towards the political nature of the process. In 
response to the political obstacles that have arisen to the transitional justice process – including 
amnesty bills for corrupt businessmen and public officials, attempts to draw an early conclusion 
to the work of the TDC, and political campaigns to forget the past and squarely look forward – 
political analysts, scholars and even members of the TDC have expressed astonishment at the 
difficulty of the task, leading many to believe that the Tunisian case has been uniquely challenging 
as a transitional process.132 In the words of the head of the TDC, Sihem Ben Sedrine, a figure who 
has come under intense scrutiny for her managerial role in the process, for “truth commissions 
around the world, the state is on their side. We are maybe the one case where the state is going 
against us.”133 In short, practitioners appear to have assumed that, in Tunisia, a “transition” had 
been secured and “justice” simply required implementation. Kora Andrieu, a UN expert working 
 
129 Republic of Tunisia, “Organic Law on Establishing and Organizing Transitional Justice,” p.1. 
130 Ibid, pp.8-10. 
131 Ibid, articles 41 and 8. The chambers are often called the “Specialised Criminal Chambers,” but are translated in 
the law as “Specialised Judicial Chambers.” 
132 Chris Stephens, “Attacks by 'deep state' leave Tunisia truth commission in crisis,” The Guardian, 11 September 
2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/11/attacks-state-tunisia-truth-commission-crisis-democracy 




on transitional justice in Tunisia and a scholar on the subject, has reflected on this common mistake 
in the field and has used the Tunisian case to encourage scholars and practitioners to reconsider 
transitional justice as “a much more complex political struggle”.134 Upon review of interviews with 
members of civil society and a member of the TDC, however, it is clear to see that the struggle for 
transitional justice does not seem limited to its political nature, but also spans much more broadly 
into a social, economic, and cultural contest.135 Ultimately, the prevailing analysis on the 
difficulties faced by the institutionally-centralised, legally-focused, and politically-dependent 
process reflect the disregard shown to previous literature on the importance of transitional justice 
from the bottom up. As has been discussed, the pursuit of justice in transition is far more than a 
legal challenge and a “political struggle”; rather, in the eyes of Tunisian youth activists at least, it 
involves social forces, changes in popular thought, and a grassroots movement towards a new 
moral imagination.136 A focus on the perspectives of marginalised communities, in this case youth, 
towards the process demonstrates the limitations of the top-down process only too clearly. 
The Introduction of Transitional Justice: Through a Youth Lens 
 Interviews with local activists revealed that the concept of “transitional justice” had been 
widely unknown in Tunisia, even amongst those at the forefront of youth engagement with the 
process. Hela Boujneh, recalled that the concept was brought in by the UN Development 
Programme and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.137 Youssef Cherif 
meanwhile remembered the concept coming to the country with the return of exiled Tunisians.138 
 
134 Andrieu, p.292. 
135 In discussions on the Tunisian “transitional justice” process, the most prominent themes were the political, legal, 
and institutional dynamics, but most often in terms of civil society’s frustrations and disappointments. Calculated 
from interview transcripts; available with author. 
136 Andrieu, p,292. 
137 Boujneh, interview with author. 
138 Cherif, interviee with author. 
37 
 
Of previous cases that were discussed in deliberations on the method of pursuing “transitional 
justice”, interviewees regularly indicated that the South African process and its TRC were 
promoted as the model for Tunisia to follow.139 Moreover, according to Emna Sammari, the only 
youth member in the national committee tasked with drafting the transitional justice law and now 
serving as an expert for UNDP helping to train the judges for the Specialised Criminal Chambers, 
unofficial mechanisms did not feature in the dialogue and debates on how the transitional justice 
process could take shape.140  
 The top-down nature of the process is clearly reflected by the design of the Transitional 
Justice Law and by scholarship on the political nature of the process, but was detailed quite 
emphatically by young activists.141 The most prominent themes raised by the interview data on the 
subject of “transitional justice” related to the political dynamics, legal issues, and the role of 
political parties.142 While the political nature of the process was a common theme throughout 
interviews, a number of respondents specified that the process was particularly “technical” and 
questioned the role of external forces, including international donors and the UN.143 Hela Boujneh, 
who campaigned for youth inclusion, explained that the process remained inaccessible to young 
people, particularly for those in neglected non-coastal areas of the country.144 In response to a 
condition that set thirty five years of age as the minimum to be considered as a candidate for the 
TDC − a condition of other national institutions also − Boujneh led a campaign to have the 
condition removed but only succeeded in so far as reducing the condition to thirty years of age. 
 
139 This was the indicated by three interviewees. Sammari; Cherif; and Anonymous, interviews, with author. 
140 Emna Sammari, interview with author, Tunis, Tunisia, 15 July 2019. 
141 Republic of Tunisia, “Organic Law on Establishing and Organizing Transitional Justice”; Andrieu; Masri, pp.77-
78. 
142 Themes drawn from the transcripts. Data available with author.  
143 Ibid. 
144 Boujneh, interview with author. 
38 
 
“Youth were excluded by law by different institutions” during the transitional period, she 
emphasised at the outset of the interview.145  
 The degree of youth marginalisation from the transitional justice process was contested by 
a member of the truth commission in an interview. Elyes Ben Sedrine, Deputy Director of 
Investigations for the TDC, emphasised that the TDC specifically sought out young graduates as 
officers for the commission to serve in testimony collection and recording, prioritising young 
women.146 Ben Sedrine noted that eighty percent of the TDC’s workforce were young people under 
twenty eight years of age.147 While the quantitative involvement in this regard is encouraging and 
merits mention in order to underscore young people’s equal technical abilities, the role of young 
people as administrators does not adequately capture the degree to which young activists might be 
agents of the systemic change they seek.  
 In light of indications of the top-down nature of the transitional justice process, the youth 
interest in systemic change, and a continued sense of youth marginalisation across Tunisia’s 
transitional projects, a specific focus on the role of youth activism provides a lens into a broader, 
more inclusive pursuit of what Gready and Robins’ call “justice in transition”.148 On the question 
of whether youth activists are contributing to the project of transitional justice – involving the 
pursuit of truth, accountability, dignity, reconciliation, the preservation of memory, and guarantees 
of non-recurrence amidst a broader transition towards human rights and democratic governance – 
interviews indicated that disengagement from formal political participation did not mean that 
young people are disengaged from a larger societal project of “justice in transition” and systemic 
change. Overall, youth activists widely sought “alternatives” to the formal political and 
 
145 Ibid. 
146 Elyes Ben Sedrine, interview with author, Tunis, Tunisia, 18 June 2019. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Gready and Robins, p.957. 
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institutional means of achieving change and looked to support transitional justice from the bottom 
up.149 These alternative methods have formed an essential part of the process, particularly in light 
of the difficulties faced by the official process and the belief that the TDC had, perhaps, not 
effectively engaged society on the truths it sought to establish. Speaking just months after the TDC 
presented its final report, Youssef Cherif, said “I’m sure many people have already forgotten about 
the work of the IVD”, using the French acronym for the Commission.150  Similarly, Hiba Ben Haj 
Khalifa, a youth activist involved with numerous informal transitional justice processes, supposed 
that “maybe one percent of Tunisians have read the report of the truth commission.”151 “[T]here 
were other ways to send a message to Tunisians that something may change”, she noted.152  
Discussing the response to government efforts to undermine the formal transitional justice process, 
Khalil Arbi emphasised that “young people realised that they had the ability to build an alternative 
movement” to defeat it and defend the goals of the transitional justice process.153 In terms of the 
specific types of alternative, informal civic spaces occupied and tools used by young people, 
interviews with both youth and non-youth activists revealed an intuitive association between youth 
and the streets as a space for protest and between youth and artistic media as a tool of expression 
– two areas of informal activism that have been crucial to gains in the pursuit of transitional justice 





149 “Alternatives” to mainstream processes were raised most explicitly by Arbi, Guesmi, and Ben Haj Khalifa. 
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Youth-Led Transitional Justice: From the Street Up 
 
 
 “[T]he streets…they give you the raw truth, the whole truth, nothing but the truth.” 
 
– Heythem Guesmi.155 
 
The State, Civil Society, and the Streets 
 Over the course of Tunisia’s heavily contested transition, the nature of the “post-
revolutionary” state has been regularly called into question. The continuation of the democratic 
transition has been widely and enthusiastically credited to the country’s prominent and active civil 
society.156 In recognition of civil society’s role facilitating dialogue and compromise amidst grave 
political impasses and even threats of civil war, a Tunisian civil society coalition known as the 
National Dialogue Quartet was awarded the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize.157 As well-deserved as such 
praise may be, the keen focus on the country’s “civil society” as a single bloc has failed to capture 
the diversity of the non-state actors engaged in the democratic transition.158 NGOs have regularly 
come together as part of a coalition on transitional justice, but, as noted in interviews conducted 
for this study, civil society organisations have been frequently distanced from one another by virtue 
of their various agendas.159 Nesrine Jelalia of  the NGO Al Bawsala, noted that the civil society 
 
155 Guesmi, interview with author. 
156 Masri pp. xxvi, 15, 42-51, 67. 
157 The Quartet was composed of four civil society groups: the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), the 
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space on transitional justice had been “very divided” and expressed concern that “civil society has 
not been able to diagnose and to rally against the one threat that they have – that transitional justice 
just gets discarded.”160 Nevertheless, as “justice” and visions of “change” encountered grave 
dangers, Tunisia was fortunate to not be solely reliant on legal institutions, or a rigid vision of 
“civil society”. Rather, another socio-political arena that is not typically raised in scholarly debates 
on transitional justice has proven itself a decisive factor in the contest over both the state-led 
process and a societal process of transitional justice from the bottom up – the streets.  
“[T]he situation in Tunisia is like [this]: we have the state, we have civil society entities 
and organisations… and we have the street,” explained Heythem Guesmi.161 In the context of the 
conflict over notions of “justice” and the direction of the transition, “the street” was raised by more 
than three quarters of interviewees as an important space of protest, and one commanded by young 
people.162 “In Tunisia now, we cannot change anything without something below from the streets”, 
emphasised Emna Sammari, a young human rights lawyer and activist.163 Just as Tunisian youth 
identity is often expressed in opposition to authority, and their longing for “change” built on a 
sense of marginalisation, young Tunisians view the street as an alternative space to occupy and 
pursue their vision of justice through protesting, campaigning, and public messaging. Nesrine 
Jelalia explained that the reason why “most of those who go into the street and organise are young” 
is that Tunisian political parties are “oligarchical and a pure product of dictatorship. Young people 
do not fit in there if they want to enjoy their freedom of action and their freedom of voice”.164 
While young people may find no alternative space than the street in this regard, they also have a 
 
160 Jelalia, interview with author. 
161 Guesmi, interview with author.  
162 Figure generated from analysis of interview transcripts; available with author. 
163 Interestingly, Sammari has a formal role within the transitional justice process training the judges for the 
Specialised Criminal Chambers. Sammari, interview with author. 
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commodity that the non-young do not have in order to command street space, namely, time. In the 
words of Guesmi: 
[I]f you don’t work from 8-6 and you’re a student, for example, you can go to protests at 
3 pm, you can go to protests at 11am… If you don’t have children and a wife and family 
and a house, you can spend the night writing on the walls and you have the privilege of 
being arrested by the police and spending the night [in jail].165 
 
Whether participating in morning protests or writing on the walls overnight, young Tunisians have 
recognised the prominence of the street as an avenue to give voice to their truths, display their 
imaginations of justice, and demand it. Further to Lundy and McGovern’s call for scholars and 
practitioners to think “imaginatively outside the ‘prevailing transitional justice box’” and “to create 
spaces for people to determine, shape, and develop solutions for themselves”, street-based activism 
in Tunisia demonstrates that young people can equally take command of such critical spaces to 
pursue transitional justice from the very bottom upwards.166 More than one third of interviewees 
indicated that social change was, in fact, being generated from the street level in Tunisia, either 
raising the effects of bottom-up “change”, “justice”, or the role of the street as its own 
“revolutionary process”. It is thus crucial to pay close attention to these forces of truth, justice, and 
transition from the street-level, as well as their agents167  
The Streets Cry for Accountability: “I Will Not Forgive” 
That young people in the street formed the largest public opposition to the introduction of 
an amnesty bill for corrupt businessmen and civil servants, let alone a bill designed by an eighty-
eight year old former regime figure, should not be surprising in light of this study’s indications of 
a Tunisian youth identity built in opposition to “old” politics and in support of “change”.168 Newly 
 
165 Guesmi, interview with author. 
166 Lundy and McGovern, p.292. 
167 Calculations generated from interview transcripts; available with author.  
168 As this study drew to a close, President Essebsi passed away in office at the age of ninety-two. Prior to his death, 
interviewed youth activists had commonly mentioned the position of youth activism in direct contrast to elderly 
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elected President Beji Caid Essebsi had served in a number of senior posts under Bourguiba and 
as President of the Assembly under Ben Ali, and, having called on Tunisia to “smile and be hopeful 
again and not talk of the past” during his campaign for the presidency, his election heralded a grave 
threat to the state-mandated transitional justice process and the TDC.169 To “improve the 
investment climate” in the country, Essebsi announced in his first Independence Day speech in 
2015 that the government would introduce a bill on economic and financial reconciliation to 
facilitate amnesties for civil servants and businessmen who had committed economic and social 
crimes, thereby circumventing the authority of the TDC on the issue.170 The youth-led protest 
campaign Manich Msamah (“I Will Not Forgive”) arose with the single purpose of defeating the 
bill and has been met with particular enthusiasm from international and national supporters of 
transitional justice as a result. Numerous interviews have been released with members of the 
campaign, introducing their creative tactics; nevertheless, deeper and broader scholarly 
examinations of the ways in which the movement has reflected and combined with distinctly 
youthful approaches to activism have not come to the fore.171  
 
political leaders, such as Essebsi and Rached El-Ghannouchi, aged seventy-eight. One interviewee noted that a 
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The campaign’s launch in August and September 2015 as a series of street protests that 
were brutalised by the police provided a reminder of the violent exclusion felt by young Tunisians 
and their motivation to pursue systemic change via alternative means.172 Understanding the scale 
of the challenge, the campaign’s leading members subsequently drew from distinctly youthful 
approaches to activism to plan an effective response. Heythem Guesmi, a prominent member of 
the movement, explained that the campaign designed itself with a horizontal decision-making 
structure and created cells across regions; sought to rally masses to public events through social 
media; and invested in tools that would revive street activism, including mass printed “Manich 
Msamah” T-shirts, banners, drums, and flares.173 To generate popular momentum, the campaign 
used young people with technical skills in online community management to run its Facebook 
page, enlisted the creative talents of young designers, and ensured its communiques could be read 
in Arabic, French, and English.174 Furthermore, this “alternative” movement was designed to be 
accessible and unmarked by the political divisions of the past, and visibly so in its street 
manifestations.175 In this regard, Mounir Saidani drew parallels between the young Tunisians who 
rejected the leaflets of political parties during the street rallies of the revolution and the ways in 
which Manich Msamah insisted that politicians stand well behind the leading section of the street 
marches.176 The campaign embodied “the new political expression, the young expression in 
Tunisia”, according to Saidani.177 By bringing popular entertainment to protests, organising 
 
172 Guesmi, interview with author; Human Rights Watch, “Tunisia: Crackdown on Peaceful Protests,” 10 September 
2015, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/10/tunisia-crackdown-peaceful-protests [accessed 21 August 
2019]. 
173 Ibid. For more analysis on the role of such activism in further solidifying a sense of “youth” identity, see Salwa 
Abdel Wahed, “The Power of a T-shirt: Youth Activism and the Civic Space in Tunisia,” Social Justice 
Perspectives, 15 December 2017, available at https://thesis.eur.nl/pub/41639 [accessed 20 August 2019]. 
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175 Arbi, interview with author. Arbi participated in the Manich Msamah campaign. 




horizontally, and rallying masses via social media, Manich Msamah members see themselves as 
part of a global wave of youthful activism around the world that includes the Occupy movement 
and the anti-austerity demonstrations of southern Europe.178   
 The Manich Msamah protests brought thousands of people to the streets as part of a 
movement that was seen as one of the largest public demonstrations in post-revolutionary 
Tunisia.179 “[I]stead of being part of the dynamic, they were the dynamic, emphasised Salwa El-
Gantri of the ICTJ on the subject of the energy and leadership of the Manich Msamah campaign 
within the wider civil society opposition to the economic reconciliation bill.180 After three years 
of leading street demonstrations, lobbying politicians alongside other civil society organisations, 
and debating the state’s approach to the transition in television debates, Manich Msamah 
succeeded in pressuring the parliament to significantly alter the content of the law, but not remove 
it completely. An “administrative reconciliation law” was passed in 2017, allowing for amnesties 
for civil servants – but not businessmen –deemed “clear” of corruption charges.181 Interviewees 
expressed a range of reactions to the outcome, with Nesrine Jelalia of Al-Bawsala noting that the 
bill was symbolically negative but its real impact unknown, while Salwa El Gantri of the ICTJ said 
that the bill only benefitted 13 individuals.182 While the effectiveness of the Manich Msamah 
campaign is often judged by the passing of a significantly reduced version of the bill, it is important 
to underline and further explore the ways in which many campaign members see the movement’s 
 
178 See Chomiak and Salman, p.2. 
179 Saidani, interview with author. 
180 El Gantri, interview with author. 
181 Without due process, it is unclear how the process ensured these individuals are not guilty of any crimes. 
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effects more broadly, outside of the limitations of the political arena, and more in line with youth 
ambitions of bottom-up change.  
 “[W]e revived the street. People [had] their hope back in the protests, on the street, 
expressing themselves publicly”, explained Heythem Guesmi.183 Despite the government’s 
attempt to have society dismiss them as “dancing children”, Guesmi said that the campaign’s key 
victory against its political and business opponents came when the activists felt that they had 
“broke[n] a lot of their arrogance.”184 Before that, much of the tactics had served to shock the 
public into societal debate by wearing T-shirts with the message “I Will Not Forgive” and with 
campaigns such as “Wanted” that saw youth activists descend into the streets at night to plaster 
images of businessmen known for corruption.185 One such businessman, Slim Chiboub, a 
businessman married to Ben Ali’s daughter, was pictured under the line “Wanted to face justice 
for stealing from the Tunisian people”, with a figure of 100 million dollars on offer for the Tunisian 
people advertised underneath.186 At a time of severe economic hardship and a growing sentiment 
that the old elite were needed to bring back fortune and prosperity, the deployment of these creative 
and new methods of engaging the public on the financial merits of pursuing accountability for 
socio-economic crimes were, seemingly, the shock that was needed to generate a discursive shift 
on what was acceptable to, and needed for, a meaningful sense of transition.187 Looking at the 
campaign from the outside, Hiba Ben Haj Khalifa said the movement’s message of “no 
reconciliation before accountability” was simple and effective in giving transitional justice a more 
 
183 Guesmi, interview with author. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Ibid; see also Chomiak and Salman. See Figure 1 below. 
186 See Figure 1 below. Henda Chennaoui, “Wanted : Après Slim Chiboub, Abdelwahab Abdallah,” Nawaat, 26 
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[accessed 20 August 2019].  
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accessible meaning amidst the widespread misunderstandings of the concept and the subversive 
narratives directed towards it.188 Manich Msamah “communicated a message of ‘these people are 
thieves; they stole [the] money of Tunisians.’ And then people started to understand what 
transitional justice is, in an economic way, but not in a political way... it was speaking to people 
in the street” said Ben Haj Khalifa.189  
 
Figure 1. Photographs of the Slim Chiboub posters as part of the Manich Msamah “Wanted” campaign. Photos: 
Huffpost Tunisie.190 
 
Within wider debates on transitional justice, the “I Will Not Forgive” campaign attests to 
a number of theories of justice-seeking from the bottom up, not least Brudholm’s compelling case 
for “resentment’s virtue”, that someone who is not willing to forgive is demonstrating the 
emotional testimony needed to demand justice and change.191 This exact sentiment was described 
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by Heythem Guesmi who explained that Manich Msamah had opponents, not enemies.192 “I don’t 
hate you, but please don’t hurt me”, he said, recounting an imagined conversation with a corrupt 
businessman., insisting on businessman.193 From the streets up, the Manich Msamah campaign 
effectively communicated this message of resentment, but not retribution, promoting an 
understanding of interdependence of old elites and the public, of stolen funds and the country’s 
future, that represents a crucial pathway towards the “moral imagination” needed to transcend 
patterns of injustice.194  
The Streets: The Emergency Room for Truth and Justice 
 Due to their visibility and accessibility, the streets have been an essential space for young 
Tunisians to communicate a continued sense of harm and an absence of justice during the narrative 
contest over the state of “transition”. While Manich Msamah sought to revitalise the case for 
accountability for past cases of corruption, the youth-led campaign Fech Nestannew (“What Are 
We Waiting For”) of 2018 used similar tactics and methods of popular protest to generate renewed 
energy for the revolutionary demands of socio-economic change.195 The  movement was led by a 
generation of activists who had recently graduated and headed student unions and young female 
activists featured prominently as its spokespeople.196 Like Manich Msamah, the “What Are We 
Waiting For” campaign also looked to the street to promote social truths and give voice to the 
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193 Ibid. 
194 Lederach, p.173. 
195 Jillian Kestler-D’Amours, “Q&A: Tunisia's protest leaders vow to keep up pressure,” Aljazeera, 14 January 
2018, available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/qa-tunisia-protest-leaders-vow-pressure-
180114072916448.html [accessed 20 August 2019].  
196 Henda Chennaoui and Warda Attig were particularly prominent members in the media. Fadil Aliriza, “Tunisia 
tackles symptoms rather than cause of austerity riots,” Middle East Eye, available at 
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/analysis-tunisia-tackles-symptoms-rather-cause-austerity-riots [accessed 20 
August 2019]. For a further reading of Fech Nestannew through the lens of feminist youth activism, see Dan 
Moshenberg, “Women are Tunisia’s revolutionary guards: What are we waiting for? Fech Nestannew?”, Women in 
and Beyond, 14 January 2018, available at http://www.womeninandbeyond.org/?p=21950#comments [accessed 20 
August 2019].  
49 
 
revolutionary youth demand of “freedom, work, and national dignity”.197 On the anniversary of 
the revolution in January 2018, some Fech Nestannew activists sported clown costumes in order 
to repel the label bestowed upon them as “troublemakers”, exemplifying a youthful embrace of 
new, popular tools and styles of activism.198 Despite these attempts to ensure that they were seen 
as peaceful, almost 800 protestors were arrested.199 At least 200 of those were aged between fifteen 
and twenty years old.200  
As demonstrated by the cycles of protest and suppression, the protest campaigns of Manich 
Msamah and Fech Nestannew utilise the streets not just as an avenue to effect change but also to 
visibly manifest youth marginalisation as a truth. From group chants of “poverty and hunger”, to 
individual claims that neglected hometowns are like “prisons”, to externally captured video 
footage of the violent suppression of the protests, the streets offered youth-led protests groups like 
Fech Nestannew to publicly communicate the harms they feel and to own the media through which 
these truths are told.201 Demonstrations have proven an integral part of the truth-telling process, 
particularly in light of the difficulties faced by the TDC and the many political impasses of the 
post-revolutionary period. Discussing the difference between institutional and top-down 
approaches to the key issues facing Tunisia, Heythem Guesmi recalled a message he delivered to 
the UN in Geneva: “Institutions are good, but the streets are better… They give you the truth, they 
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give you raw information... it’s like the emergency room. It gives you the first information about 
the wound, the injury, the problem you have.”202 The widespread sense of social and economic 
harm felt by young Tunisians embodies Jill Stauffer’s notion of “ethical loneliness”, not least as 
the TDC has been accused of failing to hear and grasp the youth struggle.203 Accordingly, the 
streets have been a primary avenue through which young Tunisians can combat this loneliness by 
telling truths and creating an “emergency room” where others are confronted with their injuries 
and can no longer deny their condition.204   
The role of the streets as the “emergency room” is most noticeable in the interior regions 
of the country, where a compound discrimination exists along the lines of age and region and 
where the politicisation of a formal transitional justice process has been seen as “out of touch” 
with society’s pressing needs.205 Recounting her engagement with young Tunisians in 
marginalised regions, Hela Boujneh mentioned the palpable “hate and anger” of young people who 
promised to turn to violence if their demands were not met, but would almost never do so as they 
have been too weak to meaningfully consider confronting security forces.206 Despite the 
overwhelming sense of injustice, youthful methods of public protesting have yielded some results. 
A youthful sit-in at an oil and gas facility in Kamour in the southern region of Tataouine in 2017 
has been cited as a model of open, self-sufficient, non-hierarchical mobilisation that has effectively 
secured commitments to a certain degree of transformative justice.207 As with Manich Msamah 
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and Fech Nestannew, the Kamour case signals the effectiveness of the public space-based protest 
to raise truths – in this case, the prevailing levels of unemployment in a resource-rich region – and 
then shape a discourse around the need for transformative remedies. The movement has been seen 
as remarkably effective as the protestors secured policy commitments on job creation and local 
development projects.208  
 Young Tunisians have not just used public street spaces to give short-term voice to the 
truths of the injustice they have felt, but have also etched them into more durable messages to 
shape the imagination of “justice”. They are most visibly found in the form of graffitied slogans, 
which have been seen as part of the country’s national heritage in the post-revolutionary context.209 
Whereas the hashtags of the Manich Msmamah and Fech Nestannew campaigns had only trended 
online for a short while, their messages calling for justice remain more permanently spray painted 
on the walls of Tunis, despite the attempts to paint over them.210 The most prevalent messages on 
display are generally those of the “Ultras” groups of Tunis’ major football teams, tagging 
allegiances of urban areas to a particular team and group. Their voices have proven some of the 
most powerful in calls for truth and justice in the wake of gross misuse of power. “RIP Omar” 
(written in English), often seen accompanied by “learn to swim” (written in Arabic) or more artistic 
reproduction of the face of Omar Laabidi can be seen widely, raising the case of a 19-year old 
Club Africain fan who, in 2018, was chased by police leaving Rades stadium and was pushed into 
a river whereupon he drowned.211 Accounts say that Laabidi was told by an officer “learn how to 
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swim” as he called for help.212 Thanks to an effective popular campaign for justice for his death, 
the now high-profile case has brought to the fore the enduring experience of police brutality and 
the misuse of power – themes that regularly arise in youth graffiti.213 From “all cops are bastards” 
(often written “ACAB” or “1312”) to “f*** the man”, young Tunisians have demonstrated a keen 
connection to global subcultures that bring a shock factor to their efforts to mould the social debate 
around their demand for systemic change.214 
 
Figure 2. Photographs of Fech Nestannew and Manich Msamah graffiti on the streets of central Tunis. Photos: 
Lawrence Robinson. 
 
212 Ibid.  
213 See Mounir Saidani, “Post-Revolutionary Tunisian Youth Art: The Effect of Contestation on the Democratization 
of Art Production and Consumption,” in Elina Oinas, Henri Onodera, Leena Suurpää (eds) What Politics?: Youth 
and Political Engagement in Africa (Leiden, Netherlands: BRILL, 2018): p.115  




Figure 3. Photograph of RIP Omar/#ta’alam ‘aoum (“learn how to swim”) graffiti in central Tunis, near the Tunis 
Marine train station. Photo: Lawrence Robinson. 
 
Figure 4. Photographs of graffiti on the streets of central Tunis, displaying the mixture of voices and messages on 
public walls. The photograph on the left displays tags of Ultras groups alongside messages of “f*** the man”. The 
photograph on the right displays the message of “all cops are bastards” alongside the message of Fech Nestannew 
(“What Are We Waiting For”) and Manich Msamah (“We Will Not Forgive”). Photos: Lawrence Robinson. 
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The rejection of forgiveness and the embrace of resentment is a clear youth message on 
display on the walls of Tunis. A similar stencil style used to spray paint Manich Msamah, for 
example, is also seen with the more detailed message of “There is no freedom in a land where its 
criminals are free. Our hunger comes from your tyranny.”215 While figures of authority would 
likely call such messages inflammatory, antagonistic, and hostile to the spirit of reconciliation, 
youth activists and theorists such as Brudholm might contend that such outrage and resentment 
can be a sign of “moral protest and ambition” that is key to any breakthrough in a societal transition 
towards peace or justice.216 For Jill Stauffer, meanwhile, “ethical loneliness” can again be read on 
graffitied walls as “hunger” or heard in interviews with young protesters as a feeling of “non-
existence”.  
 
Figure 5. Photograph of graffiti that reads “There is no freedom in a land where its criminals are free. Our hunger 




215 See Figures 4 (righthand photograph) and 5. 
216 Brudholm, p.4. 
55 
 
These feelings of hunger and a longing for freedom and justice are compounded by the 
inability of top-down transitional justice mechanisms – in this case the TDC or the ever-obstructed 
court proceedings – to thoroughly raise truths and secure justice.217 Reflecting on the ways in 
which young Tunisians are actively pursuing their visions of social change, Mounir Saidani 
encouraged close attention to the informal, daily actions of young people who “are doing things 
differently” and that these unique behaviours “are more deep in their influence on conceptions of 
transitional justice, even if, at the official level, they seem not influential.”218 The streets provide 
a clear example of one such way in which young activists have been able to influence society’s 
process of transition and justice, providing an accessible avenue for young people to express their 
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The Youthful Art of Transitional Justice from the Bottom Up 
 
 
“Old men, our rap is more listened to than your president.” 
 
– Phenix, a Tunisian rapper.219  
 
Youth, Art, Creativity, and Imagination 
 Featuring the rallying sounds of drums and trumpets, colourful costumes, and spray-
painted walls, the Tunisian streets have offered a window into just some of the uniquely creative 
and artistic features of youth activism. Beyond the specific socio-political arena of the streets, 
interviews revealed an association of youth with art, creativity, and an independent imagination 
that is important to explore more broadly in relation to the pursuit of justice in the transitional 
context. The observation of this connection is, of course, nothing new, but is popularly made across 
many societies, and with some scientific justification. In 2017, a team of psychologists explored 
the youth-creativity hypothesis with a series of experiments, finding that younger people are 
cognitively more flexible.220 The study also notes that “[c]ultural innovations, such as new socially 
significant forms of language, dress, or music often first appear in adolescents.”221 The prevalence 
of such cultural innovations in Tunisia and their relation to the youthful pursuit of truth-telling, 
memory preservation, and justice-seeking form a critical part of the bottom-up transitional justice 
process. “We have a different culture compared to the previous generation”, explained Khalil Arbi, 
pointing to the important role of art, poetry, writing, and even clothing style, for his generation’s 
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pursuit of social change.222 That “art”, and often “culture”, were important aspects of activism and 
media of expression was raised by more than forty percent of respondents.223 Specifically with 
respect to truth-telling and memory preservation, young Tunisians’ command of arts and creative 
tools have been essential aspects of the socio-cultural, bottom-up project of coming to terms with 
the past and the imagining of a more just future.  
Painting, Rapping, and Imagining Justice in Transition 
Closely connected to the graffitied messages seen all over the walls of Tunis, the city 
displays image-based street art that keenly exhibits young Tunisians’ hopes for transition and 
justice. The connection between art and truth is explicitly made in a street art gallery found under 
the major overpass in downtown Tunis, where one pillar introduces the artwork with the words of 
Martin Heidegger:  “The essential nature of art would then be this: the setting-itself-to-work of the 
truth of beings.”224 The once grey concrete pillars of the A1 overpass now feature vibrant colourful 
paintings made by students of fine arts that showcase a range of images and imaginations of post-
revolutionary Tunisia.225 Some are more abstract in their self-expression, displaying colourful 
patterns and shapes, while others’ imaginations of Tunisia and its post-revolutionary society are 
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easier to see and read, with images labelled “#RiseTunisia”, or “Freedom”, or a boat propelled by 
three wind-filled sails of “Order; Justice; Equality”.226 
 
Figure 6. Photographs from the street art gallery of the A1 underpass. Photos: Lawrence Robinson. Top left: The 
words of Martin Heidegger, “L'essence de l'art, c'est la vérité se mettant elle-même en œuvre” [“The essential nature 
of art would then be this: the setting-itself-to-work of the truth of beings.”] Top right: three pillars, furthest left in 
the foreground reading “art is humanity” and on the right “freedom”. Bottom left: a screaming face next to abstract 
colourful paintings, with the second row featuring a girl’s head filled with images of roses, a boat, Earth, and a 
Rubik’s cube. Bottom right: a boat propelled by sails of “order; justice; equality” [right to left].   
 
In contrast to some of the long-held mythologies of an inclusive, human rights-oriented 
Tunisia crafted by its “benevolent dictators”, Heidegger’s notion of art as the “truth of beings” 
comes to the fore in the people-oriented street gallery, with a noticeable subject being young 
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women’s feelings of harmful isolation, vibrant thought, and vision.227 Women’s voices, and the  
intersections of gender-, age-, and sexual identity-based marginalisation, arise as clear themes in 
post-revolutionary street art. In 2018, the city gained its “first feminist mural”, developed through 
a partnership between Chouf Minorities, a Tunisian feminist organisation working on sexual 
rights, and the Fearless Collective from South India.228 The painting depicts two women, each 
holding a flame, calling on other women to “listen to your rage” and “be tender with yourself” 
above the artists’ creative representations of female genitalia.229 Situated on a busy street in 
downtown Tunis, right next to a male-only bar, and painted during the month of Ramadan, the 
fresco proved a vibrant forum for social debate whilst being painted and embodies the hard-fought 
battle for truth and gender justice in Tunisia’s post-revolutionary context at the grassroots level.230 
As the TDC has had its own ability to raise truths critically questioned, including allegations that 
documentation of sexual- and gender-based violence was removed from the final report, the role 
of art in promoting women’s experiences of dictatorship and wider forms of socio-cultural 
repression as truths, as well as their visions of change, cannot be understated.231  
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Figure 7. Photograph of the mural, situated on Rue Garibaldi and Avenue Paris. Photo: Lawrence Robinson. 
 
Reflecting their socio-political significance, these arts spaces have been targeted for 
silencing. In early 2019, the Ministry of Equipment looked to erase the street art under the A1 
overpass, painting over the works in grey to once again match the concrete.232 In swift response, 
young photographers moved to document the gallery online while the popular outcry developed to 
later ensure that the government would create a budget to restore the paintings.233 Whether they 
involve long painting sessions with daily interactions between men and young women on gender, 






youth-created art space has proven itself a key area in the social contest over the truths of lived 
experiences and the justice that is needed for a meaningful transition. In contrast to the highly 
politicised nature of the TDC or the courts, the social positioning of arts spaces appears to make 
these contests more balanced, and more hospitable to the rebuilding of relationships, as evidenced 
by the fact that the artwork has been kept so visibly in the public realm.234 
Musical art offers another important window into the distinct forms of youth agency and 
the critical role of art in truth-telling and justice-seeking from the bottom-up. In an interview, 
Khayem Chemli, the coordinator of the transitional justice coalition for Avocats Sans Frontieres, 
emphasised the importance of musicians in popularising the transitional justice framework.235 
“[S]ometimes it’s boring what we do: press conferences and policy briefs, advocacy”, he said, 
before introducing the importance of artists who “are closer to the people” than civil society.236 
Rap and hip-hop are two distinctly youthful, subcultural styles of music that have been at the 
forefront of raising social truths and feelings of injustice among the collective consciousness. In 
November 2010, Hamada Ben Amor, known as El Général, released “Rais lebled” (President of 
the Country”) that rallied masses to protest against the prevailing injustice and was hailed as a 
revolutionary rap anthem across the region.237 The rapper, who calls himself “the voice of the 
country”, has continued to criticise those who have come to power whilst seeking to generate 
support for a second revolution with “Rayes Lebled 2” in 2014.238 
President of the country, we're still sacrificing ourselves to oppression and tyranny. 
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Go out and see what's still happening in the country! 
Your people are dying. We have no bread and we're in chains.  
They beat us with shoes and our hearts are broken.  
We're still living through the same suffering.239 
 
Just as the TDC was about to commence its technical work of discovering truths and initiating 
pathways to justice, the repeated chorus of “Rayes Lebled 2” provided an important reminder that 
a transition had not been secured and that the task of transitional justice” could not be one of 
technical implementation.240  
As a subcultural genre, hip-hop and rap have been a powerful youth-owned medium for 
young Tunisians’ freedom of expression, and their sense of agency. With songs such as “The 
Police Are Dogs,” the rap of Klay BBJ and Weld El 15 is well known for its opposition to the 
police just as the medium, as a whole, is so reflective of young Tunisians’ anti-authority identity.241 
“When I insult you my people rejoice; insulting you is my bread. Old men, our rap is more listened 
to than your president,” emphasises another rapper, Phenix, in a song with Klay BBJ.242 Mixing 
rap with dubstep and reggae, Kafon and Hamzaoui Med Amine’s track “Houmani” from 2013 
went viral, raising to the fore the continued feelings of injustice for those in urban neighbourhoods: 
We live like trash in the dustbin, 
I am so poor, I don’t have a penny, 
I don’t wake up early in the morning, 
I don’t even know what a watch is, 
This place is suffocating, 
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Whereas the formal process of truth-telling has been made divisive and quite unpopular, tracks 
such as Houmani receive tens of millions of views online and are played loudly by their subjects 
in poor neighbourhoods, by elites frequenting discos and clubs, and by car and taxi drivers.244  
For the pursuit of transitional justice, the youthful use of new music and arts styles to raise 
awareness of otherwise neglected experiences is of the utmost significance. Exploring the specific 
role of this youth-owned musical genre to raise “the truth of the everyday street experience” in an 
urban neighbourhood, Stefano Barone argues that “[t]he art of rapping displayed agency over the 
narrative of social difference in Tunisia”, and has afforded a new, though still limited, sense of 
“dignity and social recognition” for those in marginalised areas.245 For Mounir Saidani, a professor 
of sociology, rap music is just one of the fascinating ways in which young Tunisians are “saying 
other things with other words [and] with other forms”, later emphasising that “young people will 
create other manners [and] other behaviours to be in this process of transitional justice” as the 
social project continues from the bottom-up.246 As indicated by the popular art of street paintings 
and rap songs, new creative and artistic means of engaging society have proven particularly 
flexible and robust tools in the hands of young people imagining and contesting notions of “justice” 
and “transition” – characteristics that appear even more significant in light of the rapidly 
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Transmitting Voices of Memory: The Role of Youthful Creativity 
 Creativity, innovation, and art have fortunately not been limited to the realms of Tunisian 
street artists and rappers, but have been a key feature of a prominent unofficial truth project (UTP) 
in the country. “To be unique, creative and appropriate for a local context… is their greatest 
strength”, wrote Louis Bickford in 2007 about UTPs as the scholarly debate on the role of formal 
and informal processes of transitional justice came to the fore.248 Featuring an intergenerational 
collaboration between nine Tunisian women, the Voices of Memory project embodies these 
attributes as its creative and innovative methods have served to ensure that truths are told, voices 
are heard, and memories are preserved by Tunisian society.249 As a women-led project, it explores 
the critical intersection of youth and women’s activism, not least for the Tunisian context that hails 
youth and women as trailblazers and safeguards of the revolution respectively.250 Despite this 
esteem, young women interviewed nevertheless expressed a sense of marginalisation from those 
leading the transition and a need to pursue creative alternative initiatives, such as the Voices of 
Memory project, as a result. “[W]e found ourselves on the margin of transitional justice. We were 
young women involved in the topic of transitional justice but we had no idea how to be an 
alternative” to the issue-focused NGOs and older activists who “are lacking experience in 
advocacy and strategic vision,” said Hiba Ben Haj Khalifa, one of the young activists involved 
with Voices of Memory, indicating the areas where she saw the strength of young women’s 
activism.251 The project afforded Ben Haj Khalifa and other activists a unique opportunity to reveal 
these youth-owned strategic visions by designing creative methods of story-telling.252 
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 Having had her hopes for the use of new, more accessible terminology dismissed by 
practitioners in discussions on transitional justice, Ben Haj Khalifa and other young activists 
involved with Voices of Memory decided to not use the term “transitional justice” as they set about 
crafting the project.253 Nor would they “serve the truth commission”, she mentioned.254 Instead the 
project united behind a “belief in the power of storytelling as a vehicle for change” and the use of 
a wide range of creative methods in order to ensure that the testimonies are heard, understood, and 
engaged with.255 The artwork generated as part of the Living Memorial – featuring textiles, 
sculpture, video and sound installations, painting, and photography – proves a key element in the 
exhibition’s quest to “awaken in the visitor a more intimate understanding of multiple perspectives 
and complex situations” related to real and metaphorical experiences of imprisonment under 
dictatorship.256 To ensure permanent and widespread accessibility, the exhibition is available 
online as an interactive tour, where participants are accompanied by the project's symbol, the 
“koffa” (a traditional Tunisian basket used, in these cases, to bring food to prisoners), and are 
guided by a youth activist, Nadia Jmal.257 The highly visual representation of these women’s 
experiences – such as wives journeying to visit their husbands in prison, only to see jailers destroy 
the meals they had prepared and steal from their handbags – was at the forefront of one 
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interviewee’s experience of the exhibition, who raised the project as an important example of 
women-led truth-telling alongside the work of the TDC.258   
Critically, the Living Memorial was not just accessible online, but also toured the country 
in late 2018, setting up in Tunis, Sfax and the more marginalised towns of El Kef and Redeyef in 
the interior regions.259 One interviewee involved with the exhibition, Bechir Jouini, recounted the 
emotions and meanings sparked by the exhibition coming to these areas: “In Redeyef, Gafsa, 
people were crying… ‘you are here, you came to us, so we feel that we are Tunisian.’”260 He 
further explained that, in these areas where young people are known for disaffection and 
disillusionment, the exhibition drew a great number of young people and even children, some of 
whom felt moved to express demands to the government after seeing the exhibition.261 Ben Haj 
Khalifa similarly remembered children’s concerns of repetition of past crimes and experiences of 
imprisonment, whilst noting the ways in which the exhibition reached “a new audience”.262 “At 
the exhibition, I saw a lot of people I thought would never be interested in transitional justice, like 
cultural journalists, the international community in Tunisia. People came from their cocoons in La 
Marsa and came to the city centre just to see the exhibition”, she recalled.263 By travelling to 
marginalised regions, connecting the experiences of victims with younger generations through 
digital and artistic storytelling, and attracting an audience beyond the local with engaging artwork, 
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the exhibition can be seen as a pioneering initiative amidst the country’s palpable and widespread 
feelings of “ethical loneliness”.264  
 In addition to the creative use of art for the exhibition, the project also embraced Ben Haj 
Khalifa’s ideas of intergenerational storytelling by way of a graphic novel.265 In its youth-oriented, 
animated, and short comic book form,  “Carrying the Basket” tells the touching story of a 
“rebellious girl who wants to go out to march for human rights”, and her mother who tries to 
prevent her for fear of her experiencing the injustices that she and her koffa-carrying mother had 
felt.266 The story is premised on the “intergenerational gap” in Tunisia, and underscores the 
gendered, lived experience of injustice experienced by direct victims of dictatorship.267 While it 
concludes with the resolute stance of the young girl that “the time for fear has gone, mother”, it 
places older women’s experiences at the heart of the younger generation’s impassioned struggle 
for revolution, and a new era of rights and justice.268 While Ben Haj Khalifa claimed in interview 
that it is impossible to evaluate the project’s success, it can only be seen as encouraging that the 
project continues to grow and develop new initiatives that are sensitive to time and local context.269 
Scholarship would suggest that this is critical to effective peacebuilding and the pursuit of bottom-
up change, as put by Lederach:  
The goal is not stasis, but rather the generation of continuous, dynamic, self-regenerating 
processes that maintain form over time and are able to adapt to environmental change. 
Such an infrastructure is made up of a web of people, their relationships and activities, 
and the social mechanisms necessary to sustain the change sought.270 
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 Further to the art exhibition, the comic book, and other modern digital content, such as online 
podcasts, the Voices of Memory project produced a book of oral history testimonies from Tunisian 
women on experiences of prison in mid-2019.271 Supported and facilitated by Haifa Zangana, a 
Kurdish-Iraqi novelist and former prisoner under Saddam Hussein, and introduced by the Tunisian 
author Shukri Mabkhout, “Journals of Salt” indicates again the way in which the intergenerational 
project continues to generate a far-reaching web of people and develop new mechanisms through 
which memories can be preserved and the case for justice effectively made.272 Despite the project’s 
continued growth and regeneration, Hiba Ben Haj Khalifa remained critical of the initiative and 
noted ways in which it could have been improved.273 “I think we failed on the communication 
level” she said, noting a lack of time to advertise and refine messaging.274 The young women 
activists had succeeded to bring artistic initiatives to the transitional justice space where UNDP 
had made “failed” attempts at a film and a play; however, as a “firm believer in the power of art”, 
Ben Haj Khalifa still felt that the initiative could have been more creative and farther reaching.275 
Disheartened by the fact that the project’s voices were all of an Islamist orientation, Ben Haj 
Khalifa noted that her visualisation of the project had involved storytelling far beyond the 
limitations of Tunisia’s conventional socio-political divisions, instead creating a project that might 
draw parallels with groups that remain particularly marginalised in the post-revolutionary context, 
such as the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer or Questioning, and Intersex (LGBTQI) 
community.276  
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 From their own roles on the margins, young Tunisians, and particularly young Tunisian 
women, have shown a strong command of the “alternative”, the new and creative, and the artistic 
that is critical to the theory of bottom-up transitional justice. While youth activists working within 
the structure of a UTP might find their creative visions limited, youth-led artistry on issues related 
to transitional justice (truth-telling, storytelling, memory preservation, and justice-seeking) can be 
seen operating on numerous levels. Youth creativity is exhibited in street paintings under bridges, 
in rap music online and through car speakers, as well as in a UTP’s artistic representations of 
victims’ testimonies. Such is the importance of youth-led creativeness to the idea of transitional 
justice from the bottom-up, that it is almost never associated with the abstract, formal label of 
“transitional justice” in the local context; yet, in public space, it manifests itself as a potent social 





















I would there were no age between ten and three-and-twenty, or that youth would sleep out 
the rest; for there is nothing in the between but getting wenches with child, wronging the 
ancientry, stealing, fighting–Hark you now.   
 
– Shepherd, The Winter’s Tale (William Shakespeare).277 
 
 
 That “youth” is a troublesome age group to simply be forsaken has rarely been an 
unpopular opinion. In the neglected yet pervasive conflict between “the young” and “the old”, the 
“youth” and the “ancientry”, “juveniles” and “grownups”, young people are repeatedly 
characterised as the immoral, the promiscuous, and the wrongdoers.278 Revered ancient scholars 
such as Aristophanes have hardly sparked a keen interest in the roles young people might play 
outside of their stereotyped associations with troublemaking, naivety, and inexperience.279 Even 
during critical moments for social reflection, when societies look to transition from conflict to 
peace, dictatorship to democracy, injustice to justice, few scholarly sources have transcended the 
popular stigmatisation of youth to indicate ways in which societies might recognise young people 
as resourceful assets, not merely as a burden to be endured. The field of transitional justice, with 
its prevailing emphasis on top-down state interventions, institutions, and legal approaches, has 
been particularly resistant to the idea that young people might have a role to play.280 The common 
disregard and dismissal of young people in such a complex struggle has prompted this study’s 
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exploration of the role(s) of youth activism in pursuing transitional justice within wider scholarly 
debates on the importance of utilising unofficial methods and engaging marginalised communities. 
Having followed the international model of a truth commission to lead a state-mandated process 
and with a renowned “revolutionary youth”, the Tunisian experience has provided a uniquely 
important case to shed light on the critical, yet under-appreciated roles of youth activism in 
transitional justice.281 
A Theory of Youth Activism and Bottom-Up Transitional Justice 
 Drawing from the case of Tunisia, this thesis has shown that, as young people are 
marginalised from the official processes of transitional justice, they actively seek and offer 
alternative approaches that are critical to a much broader, societal project of pursuing transitional 
justice from the bottom up. From their experiences of marginalisation arise a distinct group youth 
interest in sweeping social change and a command of informal civic spaces and tools through 
which youth activists can re-imagine truth and justice and provide accessible ways of broader 
societal engagement with the concrete issues at the heart of transitional justice.  
 The theory of youth marginalisation leading to youth-led, alternative truth-telling and 
justice-seeking methods is built on the sequenced exploration of youth agency in the context of 
the many contests related to a society’s pursuit of transitional justice, not one limited to the legal 
spheres or the political realm.282 In light of the predilection towards painting “youth” with a broad 
brush, both in commentary on post-revolutionary Tunisia and further afield, the study approached 
a series of intricate questions of what it means to be “young” in Tunisian society, how young 
Tunisian activists have envisioned “justice” in the post-revolutionary environment, and how these 
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youth activists have mobilised in unique ways in pursuit of their vision of transition and justice. 
The study has illustrated a more complex picture of what it means to be “young” in society and 
that conventional age-associated definitions of “youth” are misguided.283 Interviews indicate that 
“youth” is constructed by social, political, and economic factors and experiences, with young 
Tunisian activists expressing a group identity built on feelings of “deception”, a longing for 
“freedom”, and an intimate connection to (the) “revolution”.284 The goal of “change” arose as an 
unmistakeably prominent theme in response to questions on the “justice” sought and to the ways 
in which young activists look to “alternative” methods to pursue their visions of change, transition, 
and justice.285 As the formal transitional justice struggled to surpass the political limitations 
involve with a top-down process, young activists have been integral to the more grassroots-level 
pursuit of transitional justice from the bottom up. In this regard, the thesis serves to emphasise the 
range of forces involved in society’s project of coming to terms with the past, shedding light on 
the youth-led command of the streets as an important socio-political arena and on art as a useful 
tool in the fiercely fought contest over “transition” and “justice”. With regard to the streets, the 
analysis has provided detailed analysis of youthful street-led campaigns, such as Manich Msamah 
and Fech Nestannew, which have been powerful forces in the calls for truth, accountability, and 
justice.286 Graffiti, meanwhile, has been shown to provide particularly durable messages that shape 
society’s imagination of and expectation for justice as youth-led rejections of forgiveness have 
been so markedly etched onto the walls of Tunis.287 In the streets and more broadly, youth-created 
art space has also proven itself a key arena in the social contest over the truths of lived experiences 
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and the justice that is needed for a meaningful transition.288 Youthful creativity is exhibited in 
street paintings under bridges, in rap music online, as well as in the artistic and creative expression 
of victims’ testimonies and experiences of authoritarian rule, as demonstrated by the Voices of 
Memory project.289 For truth-telling, memory preservation, and justice-seeking, these artistic 
initiatives have been robust yet adaptable − attributes that have been lacking in the formal 
transitional justice processes.290 Due to the associations of transitional justice with top-down 
measures, these distinctly youthful initiatives were often explored in relation to more inclusive 
concepts within the field, demonstrating the critical role of these youth-led alternatives in 
communicating messages of “resentment” and feelings of “ethical loneliness”, as well as 
promoting a new “moral imagination”.291 It is in light of the transitional justice field’s top-down 
tendencies that these sequenced assertions on the uniquely important position of youth actors 
leading informal approaches are purposefully presented as contributions to the transitional justice 
field in the confidence that new theories and practices will gain momentum. 
 The transitional justice field has, of course, not produced sufficient interest in youth to 
support or contradict this thesis; yet, the peacebuilding field offers some cases to bolster this 
argument of youth’s importance in transitional justice from the bottom up, despite the prevailing 
problematic interest in youth as troublemakers and soldiers. In Bosnia, Northern Ireland and Israel, 
for example, youth activists have also made clear a shared interest in the “push for change”; they 
have felt marginalised from the political discussions of peace processes; and they are often found 
“at the center of debates within a society or community in conflict.”292 In interface projects in 
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Belfast, Northern Ireland; the Youth Against Crime project in Soweto, South Africa; and the 
research of the Kosovar Youth Council in Kosovo, young people are regularly and prominently 
found at the grassroots level of peacebuilding and community relations work.293 The distinctly 
youthful and alternative ways in which young people have mobilised from the bottom up are 
nonetheless rarely detailed and thoroughly captured outside of post-war contexts, such as Northern 
Ireland and the Balkans, or articles making general assumptions on youthfulness. This thesis 
significantly develops and widens the scope of the argument developed from the case of Northern 
Ireland that, due to the factors of structural exclusion and insecurity, young people have a 
“peacebuilding potential [that] emerges in their critical questioning of the status quo” by detailing 
the many alternative methods of truth-telling and justice-seeking that are so critical to the 
objectives of transitional justice, not only community-level mediation.294 Examining these 
alternative methods in some breadth, this study can also be seen in more concrete support of Johan 
Galtung’s hesitant supposition of a relationship between youth’s desire for change and what he 
calls “creativity II” – the more advanced ability to generate new questions, instead of finding new 
answers to old questions.295 The Solomon Islands had previously been promoted as one of the few 
examples of youth engagement with transitional justice outside of the narrow victim/perpetrator 
binary and their role as “passive subjects”, but nonetheless looked at the role of youth within the 
TRC, thereby maintaining the transitional justice field’s preoccupation with official methods.296 
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Accordingly, this thesis offers a unique contribution in its delineation of the multifaceted nature 
of youth agency – from grassroots street movements, to the use of art, to indications of “creativity 
II” – within the framework of transitional justice and for the theory of transitional justice from the 
bottom up.297 
Youth and Transitional Justice: Limitations and Further Questions  
 Particularly in the hope that this thesis might spark greater attention towards the active 
roles of youth in transitional justice going forward, it is important to note a number of limitations 
and further questions associated with the conclusions drawn. Firstly, this thesis has emphasised its 
focus on youth “activists” and thus cannot be seen in reflection of the agency of all young people 
or “youth”. In light of the unscholarly conclusions that might be drawn from generalising 
commentary on “youth”, it is critical to highlight the intersections of identity and experience, such 
as along the lines of youth and activism, youth and regional identity, or youth and gender, and so 
on. Despite the attempt of the thesis to integrate these intersections, there is a limit to the scope of 
the field research and the final paper to reflect such intersections. This provides important areas 
for further study. The indications of compound marginalisation along the lines of youth, gender, 
region, and class, to name but a few, would shed much greater light on the roles of marginalised 
communities in catalysing the societal pursuit of transitional justice from the bottom up.  
More broadly, the thesis draws from a limited number of qualitative interviews, time 
period, and exploration of field locations. Longer research projects might further explore youth 
activists’ initiatives in more rural settings, across the different generations of youth, and other 
forms of distinctly youthful activism that might be seen in workplaces, on campuses, after sporting 
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events, around festivals, in new media, and further afield.298 Furthermore, it is important to 
recognise that this study has analysed only an early phase of the transitional justice process in 
Tunisia.299 Throughout the post-revolutionary period, truths were still in the process of 
development; the societal interest in the idea of transitional justice was fiercely contested; and 
“justice” and reforms appeared as distant goals, even as this research was conducted at the close 
of the TDC’s work in 2019.300 As a result of the context, the conclusions drawn focus on the role 
of youth activism during a specific phase of transitional justice, focussing on early aspects of a 
wider process, namely, truth-telling, story-telling and memory preservation; demands for 
accountability; and the imagination of justice. While transitional justice mechanisms are of a 
special nature and temporary, the Tunisian case demonstrates that the process of coming to terms 
with the past and establishing a new era will be a long-term project.301 Over this time period there 
is an intriguing area for further exploration regarding the sense of youth identity in relation to the 
socio-political context. Whether “youth identity”, built on a longing for change, remains fixed to 
the rate of social change can only be discovered by longer and broader field studies.302 Regardless 
of that broader sense of youth identity, younger generations will continue to emerge and set new 
benchmarks of what is considered youthful, innovative, and creative, and, critically, where new 
processes of transitional justice from the bottom up will start.  
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Lessons on “Youth” and “Transitional Justice”  
 The assertions of this thesis indicate that significant attention is required in order to remedy 
problematically-framed discussions on these issues. The following points of emphasis are relevant 
to scholars, practitioners, and policymakers engaged on issues of youth and transitional justice, 
respectively, and to those that might be moved to look at the nexus of the two more closely, and 
serve to underscore critical areas for the re-evaluation of current approaches. 
The Tunisian case has demonstrated the complexities of what it means to be young and 
that international age-set definitions are baseless.303 In light of the prevalence of a sense of youth 
marginalisation, stigmatisation, and victimisation, it is of urgent importance that studies explore 
and emphasise well-informed findings related to the meaning of youth.304 Definitions might be re-
framed; they might be abandoned; but what is more important is that lived experiences of youth 
are understood and promoted. The Independent Progress Study on Youth, Peace and Security 
offers an important foundation and recommendations on ways forward to engage young people in 
decision-making on issues of peace and security; however, as delineated throughout this thesis, 
the keen interest in youth and war itself emanates from stereotypical associations of youth with 
violence and as a societal burden.305 The human rights field, in general, is designed to combat 
inequalities and discrimination but has neglected the promotion of “youth” as its own category. 
There is a Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, a 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, a Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities, and other treaties that aim to eliminate injustice; however, 
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discrimination against youth is barely recognised in society, let alone in international law.306 In 
short, the human rights field is failing to engage with what it means to be young, the experiences 
of young people in society, and the ways in which young people’s feelings of harm can be 
remedied. 
This case study has further shown that conventional methods of transitional justice, led by 
the TDC, have been widely seen as a failure in Tunisia.307 In the words of one respondent, 
“[T]ransitional justice is a set of rules...it’s an administration, a commission, but behind all this 
you have humanity, humans, victims, pain... You lose transitional justice when you make a 
commission.”308 The study revealed that notions of transitional justice from the bottom up, via 
informal methods, had not been widely known.309 While these debates may feature in scholarly 
discussions, it is clear that practitioners have not appreciated the importance of a range of 
approaches to transitional justice as models and mechanisms continue to be transplanted from 
country to country regardless of the context. This study, for example, has indicated a wide range 
of civic tools and spaces of truth-telling and justice-seeking – from unofficial truth projects, to 
music artists, to the street as its own truth forum – that can be learned from in order to fuel engaging 
bottom-up processes.310 Transitional justice has for too long been seen as the near exclusive work 
of legal mechanisms.311 While the Tunisian case has prompted some scholars and practitioners to 
 
306 As youth and children are clearly separate social categories, the Convention on the Rights of the Child does not 
provide a framework for guaranteeing young people’s rights. UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, 18 December 1979, p. 13, 
available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3970.html [accessed 1 September 2019]; UN General Assembly, 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, United Nations, Treaty Series, 
vol. 660, 21 December 1965, p. 195, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3940.html  [accessed 1 
September 2019];  UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, A/RES/61/106,  
24 January 2007, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/45f973632.html [accessed 1 September 2019].  
307 See chapter two. 
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emphasise the political contest at its core, this examination of the Tunisian experience encourages 
a much wider shift of the task of transitional justice.312 Ultimately, to come to terms with the past 
and set forward a new era of human rights is not just a legal task and a political contest, but also a 
social project that involves far-reaching efforts to move society to transition towards justice. Youth 
and other marginalised actors should be recognised and engaged as important resources in this 
colossal task if discussions on transition and justice are to have meaning. 
Youth and a New Transitional Justice? A Concluding Note 
 Though the field was only conceptualised in the late 1980s and early 1980s, the case of 
Tunisia illustrates that transitional justice formulae appear rigid and outdated. “[T]he concept of 
transitional justice is very old”, said Emna Sammari, describing her disappointment with the 
construction of the Tunisian process and the need for researchers to innovate the conceptual 
foundations of the field.313 With a predilection towards new, innovative approaches to transitional 
justice, youth activists offer critical insights into the ways in which the field might evolve in order 
to more effectively facilitate justice in transitional contexts. In command of alternative spaces, 
such as the streets, and creative new tools, young Tunisian activists demonstrate that the 
transitional justice field must, itself, keep up with ever-evolving actions in pursuit of justice and 
transition from the ground.314 Tunisian youth activists indicate that new generations, both 
domestically and abroad, will continue to bring such important innovations to the field, whether 
they are recognised or not. For the Tunisian context, Youssef Cherif, underscored that “a new 
youth movement” is coming to the fore.315 They are “self-confident and don’t have any respect for 
older people, for older politicians, or any fear of older politicians from the establishment… 
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[M]aybe we will witness another revolution with these emerging youth in Tunisia”, he 
speculated.316 Heythem Guesmi noted that the arrival of these younger activists was a sign of “slow 
hope”.317 “For me, in this dark situation, I’m so proud to be in this generation”, he said, expressing 
support for his younger peers coming onto the scene.318 There is a clear confidence amongst young 
activists that coming generations will also bring new approaches to the questions of transition and 
justice. Offering advice from the Tunisian experience to youth activists elsewhere, Hiba Ben Haj 
Khalifa emphasised, “if you have [an] alternative to the process, just do it”.319 With a natural sense 
of connection between “youth” and “alternatives”, young activists have no doubt that their 
counterparts in other countries will have new and innovative innovations to bring to their societies 
and to the field of transitional justice. The onus will be on transitional justice scholars and 
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